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This Article examines presidential direction of administrative action in the
Obama and early Trump Administrations against the backdrop of ongoing
debates concerning: (i) the desirability of and appropriate techniques for
presidential control ofadministration and (ii) the relevance ofseparated powers
when American government is under unified political control. To give this
analysis a concrete context, the Article provides in-depth case studies of
presidential administration in immigration policy, climate change policy, and
executive structuring of the administrative state, under both the Obama and
early Trump Administrations. Based on these three case studies, the Article
argues that proponents of "presidentialism, " who base their support on the
supposed effectiveness and democratic legitimacy of muscular presidential
administration, have operated with an anemic and poorly specified set of
normative criteria. These defects have led supporters to overstate the benefits
and understate the risks of presidentialism. The Article further concludes that
claims of the functional demise of separated powers, like Mark Twain's death,
have been exaggerated. While one cannot understand the functioning of
separated powers without understanding the dynamics of party competition,
separation of powers has retained functional importance in periods of both
unified and divided government notwithstanding the emergence of the current
era ofhyper-partisanship.
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Introduction
This Article uses recent history to reconsider two longstanding debates in
public law and administration. Specifically, this Article examines presidential
direction of administrative action in the Obama and early Trump Administrations
against the backdrop of ongoing debates concerning: (i) the desirability of and
appropriate techniques for presidential control of administration and (ii) the
relevance of separated powers when American government is under unified
political control. These issues have a history stretching back to the Republic's
founding, but retain contemporary relevance.
Both President Obama and President Trump have wielded presidential
authority powerfully to shape administrative policy. Moreover, the periods of the
Obama Administration and the early Trump presidency provide an opportunity
to observe the differential effects of separation of powers-with and without
what some have termed "separation of parties"1 -- on presidential administration
in the American system. While the Obama administration mostly operated in the
context of deeply divided political institutions, President Trump began with a
unified government.
To keep the scope of analysis reasonably manageable, our discussion is
limited to three arenas of recent presidential action: immigration policy,
environmental regulation related to climate change, and the structure of the
administrative state. To say that Presidents Obama and Trump have divergent
views on these matters is surely an understatement. Hence, a look at these three
topics casts special light on the extent and limits of presidential administration
and particularly the durability of presidential policymaking.
Before undertaking our case studies in Part IV, we sketch some important
constitutional background in Part I. In Parts II and 1II, we situate our case studies
1. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REv. 2312 (2006).
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in the context of two broader, ongoing theoretical debates. One is a more
normative debate, described in Part 111, about the legality and desirability of
"presidential administration" or "presidentialism," meaning roughly, muscular
presidential direction and control of administrative policy. The other is a more
descriptive debate, described in Part III, about the relative influence of basic
governmental structure-particularly the relative importance of, on the one
hand, an institutionally unified or an institutionally separated system of powers
and, on the other, partisan political alignments across government, irrespective
of institutional structure. Put more concretely, this second debate is about
whether separation of powers matters when the same political party controls both
Congress and the presidency. These two debates are connected. The functioning
of separated powers informs both the possible and desirable scope of presidential
administration.
In general, this study finds in both administrations bold attempts to accrete
executive power; presidential administration insinuating itself more and more
into areas where proponents of presidentialism have cautioned against
aggressive use of presidential directive authority; and the rise of organizational
techniques, like policy czars and "shadow cabinets," that institutionalize
presidential control in the absence of specific presidential directions. Our case
studies also suggest a judicial anxiety with broadening presidential exercises of
domestic authority. But recentjudicial opinions cabining aspects of that authority
have, in our view, sometimes employed questionable reasoning from the
perspective of standard administrative law doctrine and may not endure.
We also see a general lack of durability for presidential policy actions
across these two Administrations. Indeed, the speed with which presidential
administration in the Obama era has been undone by the Trump administration
is impressive. To the extent that Obama-era administrative policies have proven
even mildly durable, it has been due to political rather than legal constraints or
the amount of legal process that initially went into those policies. The rise of
administrative governance, combined with muscular presidentialism, can
produce dramatic, but perhaps ephemeral, shifts in public policy in the face of
congressional inertia and the durability of the statutory bases for administrative
action.
Pluralist skepticism of presidential authority has, in some respects, had
certain of its concerns vindicated, but presidentialism retains normative
attractiveness. Assembly government in tension with executive government is
what our system is meant to produce. Over the course of American history, the
ascendency of one over the other has shifted many times. The challenge is to
moderate the shortcomings of each, when ascendant. The pushback of the non-
ascendant mode is a means to achieve that moderation, which is why we also
consider separation of powers in unified government. And while one certainly
cannot comprehend the function of American government without the
"separation of parties" perspective discussed below, we still see a real and
important role for institutional separation of powers, broadly understood to
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include, in addition to congressional-presidential competition, both judicial
defense of congressional policies embodied in statutes and the role of the career
bureaucracy in shaping administration.
I. Constitutional Preliminaries
The ongoing debate concerning presidential power in the American system
persists because the Constitution and administrative law doctrine are startlingly
vague about the structure of administrative power and the President's role in it.
As one of us has argued elsewhere, there is a hole in the American Constitution
where administration might have been.2 The Constitution anticipates but fails to
create any administrative institutions and divides the creation and control of
administration between Congress and the President. Article II gives the President
the authority to appoint the heads of "Departments," whatever those are, but
leaves the designation of appointive power for all other officials to Congress.3
And the President's appointments require S.enate approval.4 The Constitution
says nothing about removal of an official, save for the awkward and cumbersome
process of impeachment.
The general contours of executive power, as prescribed by the Constitution,
also remain ambiguous. The President must "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,"6 but the only power explicitly conferred on the President to
carry out that responsibility is the power to require written reports from the heads
of departments. Meanwhile, Article I of the Constitution provides congressional
powers that are understood to be broad.8 These Delphic provisions concerning
political control of administration have been left to be elaborated by practice,
convention, and judicial construction.
That last source, Supreme Court doctrine, is sparse and often vague or
contradictory. Most of the relevant doctrine involves appointments and
removals.9 By convention, the appointing official is considered to have the
removal power unless otherwise specified by statute. Congress cannot insert
itself into appointment or removal, save by exercising the Senate's power of
advice and consent to presidential appointments;' 0 providing for the appointment
of officials other than department heads by the President, a department head, or
the courts;" and by impeachment. Congress may also, at least in certain
2. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (2012).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. Id.
5. Id. art. 11, § 4.
6. Id. art. II, § 3.
7. Id. art. II, § 2.
8. See id. art. I, § 8; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
9. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-37 (1976).
10. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
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circumstances, regulate the qualifications for appointment of particular officers
and require that their removal be only for cause.12
There is, however, some limit to congressional authority to condition
presidential removal authority on cause, under the vague standard that Congress
may not "unduly trammel" on executive authority.1 3 That standard was
enunciated in a case that permitted for cause removal with respect to a
consequential presidential power: criminal prosecution of administration
officials. That same standard apparently served to invalidate a so-called "double
for cause" provision, where one executive official is subject to for-cause removal
solely by a superior, whose removal by the President is similarly restricted.14
Yet, as the dissenting justices in that case pointed out, "double for cause" would
have no practical impact on presidential authority.' 5 In terms of meaningful
constraints on the President's removal authority, one might think these results
should be reversed.
Beyond appointments and removals, Supreme Court doctrine is mostly
silent concerning a vast array of potential presidential actions designed to shape
administrative policy. Here, we are largely in the arena of practice and
convention-practices and conventions that are hardly uniform across policy
domains or constitutional history.
This dearth of definitive constitutional doctrine sets the stage for the
continuing debates about the appropriateness and efficacy of presidential
administration, and the effects of the Constitution's separation of powers on the
practical allocation of power between Congress and the President to control
administrative action. Nevertheless, we should not leave this discussion of legal
doctrine without noting the important role of judicial review. Separation of
powers includes an independent judiciary whose decisions may reinforce one or
the other political branch. Although administrative inaction is largely not subject
to judicial review, thus leaving agenda setting' 6 and prosecutorial or enforcement
discretion 7 largely in executive hands, administrative action is presumptively
subject to judicial oversight. 8 Moreover, that review is premised on a search for
an appropriate connection between the exercise of administrative power and the
legislation under which the administrator has acted. Administrators must give
reasons for their actions, and those reasons must explain how the actions promote
12. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
13. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988).
14. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
15. Id. at 524-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61-67 (2004) (finding agency
discretion as to broad, programmatic policy choices to be generally unreviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
17. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding agency prosecutorial discretion is
presumptively unreviewable).
18. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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or implement the policy specified in their governing statutes. 19 "The President
told me to do it" is not a legal reason for agency action, except in those instances
(largely concerning foreign affairs) in which the Constitution gives the President
independent authority, or where Congress has statutorily delegated
administration to the President.
To read press accounts of the day-to-day activities of the federal
government is to imagine, many times quite accurately, that the White House
(now a sprawling bureaucracy in its own right) controls all administrative action.
Yet at the level of administrative law doctrine, when judicial review is available,
the question is always whether an agency or department has exercised this
discretion in accordance with its governing statute. Judicial review of
administrative action is therefore dedicated to the defense of congressional
policy choice-at least where that policy can be discerned.
II. Theories of Presidential Administration: Presidentialism vs. Pluralism
With these constitutional ambiguities in mind, we turn to the debate over
the proper scope of presidential administration. In broad terms, theorists of
presidential authority fall into two camps: presidentialists and pluralists. We will
confine ourselves here to description of two leading accounts: Justice, then
Professor, Elena Kagan's account of presidentialism and Professor Peter Shane's
argument for pluralism. U.S. academic literature related to these theories is a
torrent that offers intricate versions of the actual or appropriate extent of
presidential power to control administrative action.20
A well-known article by Justice Kagan provides the paradigmatic scholarly
presentation of presidentialism. 2 1 Her article gives both a historical account of
the ascendancy of "presidentialism" and argues for the normative desirability of
this energetic vision of the presidency. On her account, modern presidentialism
began in the Reagan Administration. While prior administrations generally
avoided perceived direct intervention in regulatory processes like administrative
rulemaking, President Reagan "self-consciously and openly adopted strategies
to exert" direct and authoritative "influence" over the administrative state.22
Kagan identifies two key mechanisms that President Reagan used to bring his
influence to bear. First, he used "his appointment power, perhaps more
successfully than any other modern President, to staff the agencies with officials
19. See, e.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1245-6 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (invalidating agency action because the agency made its decision based on impermissible political
reasoning).
20. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Forward: Lookingfor Power in Public Law, 130 IARV.
L. REv. 31, 34-35 (2016) (cataloguing sources on presidential authority).
21. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245 (2001). Indeed,
it is the most-cited American law review article from its year of publication. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle
Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles ofAll Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1495 tbl.2 (2012).
22. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2277.
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remarkable for their personal loyalty and ideological commitment." 2 3 Second,
and more innovatively, his Administration issued the now-iconic Executive
Order 12,291 .24 That order required that all (non-independent) agencies perform
cost-benefit as well as cost effectiveness analyses for major rules, and mandated
that agencies, to the extent permitted by law, follow the Order's stated policy
goals.25 Agency analyses were made subject to review by the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), a part of the Executive Office of the President (EOP).26
President Clinton is presented by Kagan as having "expanded dramatically"
on President Reagan's innovations. 2 7 To a greater degree, President Clinton
"ma[de] the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more and more
an extension of the President's own policy and political agenda." 28 His
administration, in its own Executive Order on OIRA and the regulatory process,
built on the concepts in Reagan's EO 12,291 to claim more directly "that the
President had authority to direct executive department . .. heads in the exercise
of their delegated rulemaking power." 29 Even if statutes invested agency heads
with authority, Clinton's EO implied that the President had the power to dictate
how that authority was to be used.o
That implication was the basis for President Clinton's practice of "issuing
formal directives to executive branch officials regarding the exercise of their
statutory discretion." 31 To those executive officials, these directives were, in
Professor Kagan's telling, mandatory. Kagan argues that this directive authority
changed "the understanding of agency and White House officials alike of their
respective . . . powers."32 The effects of the President's assertion of his role as
ultimate decider are difficult to trace to individual agency decisions, but on
Kagan's account, it effected a broader revolution in administrative roles. 33 A
stronger identity arose between administration and the Administration.
23. Id.
24. Federal Regulation, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
25. Those goals included: (i) only pursuing regulatory action for which "the potential
benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs" and (ii) choosing, from among possible
regulatory policies, the policy with "the least net cost to society." Id. § 2(b) & (d).
26. See id. § 3.
27. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2248.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2288; Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. OrderNo. 12,866,58 Fed. Reg.
51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
30. See John Yoo, An Executive Without Much Privilege, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/26/opinion/26yoo.html [http://perma.cc/5XDP-VWJ7] ("Thus even if
Congress, for example, gave the Environmental Protection Agency the job of setting clean air standards,
President Clinton assumed the authority-without any direct permission in the law-to set the standards
on his own.").
31. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2293. By Kagan's count, Reagan issued nine such
directives, and Bush I issued four. Clinton issued 107. Id. at 2294-95.
32. Id. at 2299.
33. Id.
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Kagan notes two aspects of Clinton Administration practice that are
important to her subsequent normative justification of Clinton-style
presidentialism. First, Kagan describes the careful, collaborative process behind
these directives.34 Second, Kagan describes how President Clinton took "public
... ownership of agency action" commensurate with his claimed legal
ownership. In what Kagan terms "appropriation," President Clinton publicly
presented administrative action as his action. He thereby "set a new standard" of
presidential communication with the public.36
Kagan argues that this strong presidential control of administration
promotes both "accountability and effectiveness."37 In terms of accountability,
the identity between the President and administration provides a transparency
that "enable[es] the public to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature
of bureaucratic power."38 The President, as the sole politician with a national
constituency, provides the best (or, alternatively, least bad) electoral link
between the voting public and administration. 39 The presumption here is that
presidents are, like Clinton, public about their control of-and so accountable
for-administration.
Presidential control also promotes "regulatory effectiveness,,, 40 according
to Kagan, because the President brings "a certain kind of dynamism or energy to
administration."4 1 In the era of divided government, the President can "provide
energetic leadership in an inhospitable political environment." 42 Congress may
be too gridlocked to act, and the federal bureaucracy is allegedly too sclerotic to
effect dynamic change. Enter the President, whose centralized control and policy
vision can transcend this morass. Kagan acknowledges the "august lineage" of
arguments "against this kind of activism" in American political theory,43 but she
ultimately dismisses these Madisonian, separation-of-powers concerns. She
finds sufficient comfort in the President's public accountability,4 4 as well as the
remaining prerogatives of Congress and the courts.45
34. Id. at 2297-98.
35. Id. at 2299.
36. Id. at 2300 (quoting Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, The Politicization of
Public Opinion: The Fight for the Pulpit, in THE SOCIAL DIVIDE: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FUTURE
OF ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT 96 (Margaret Weir ed., 1998)).
37. Id. at 2251-52.
38. Id. at 2331-32.
39. Id. at 2333-37. In her article, Kagan critiques a version of this electoral argument
put forward by one of us, but her analysis nonetheless reaches a similar conclusion. For her, the President
is the least-bad democratic link to administrative action. In politics, the best option rarely has more to
recommend it than that.
40. Id. at 2339.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2344.
43. Id. at 2342.
44. Id. at 2345-46.
45. Id. at 2346-52.
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As for concern that presidential control will privilege politics over expertise
in agency decisions, Kagan makes two arguments. First, she minimizes the
authority of expertise to "drive" major agency decisions.46 Second, she cautions
that a properly presidentialist executive will show "restraint" before heavily
interfering in "regulatory action that in large measure depends on scientific
methodology."4 7
The contrary vision, the "pluralist" view of American government, is well-
described and defended in Peter Shane's book Madison's Nightmare.48 Shane
focuses on the presidentialist practices of the Bush II Administration. And where
Kagan saw promise, Shane sees peril.
Descriptively, Shane picks up from where Kagan left off. President Clinton,
as he writes, indeed "embraced unitary executive behavior by exerting increased
political control of agencies." 4 9 Even if Shane would be willing to support some
of President Clinton's administrative coordinating practices, 50 he argues that the
George W. Bush Administration "accelerat[ed] . . . presidentialist practice" to a
"breathtaking" degree.5t Bush II continued to employ Clintonian directive
authority,52 but while Kagan (and the Clinton White House) did not promote an
absolutist theory of a unitary executive, Bush II embraced it. Shane catalogues
Bush's "expansion of every claim of executive power to the outer limits." 5 3 He
reviews the most aggressive claims, as embodied in Bush II's "signing
statements" that he issued when signing legislation into law.54 These statements
often sharply challenged the constitutionality of various aspects of congressional
acts on the grounds that these laws, or some aspect of them, somehow impinged
on the executive's absolute authority.55 President Bush's broad conception of
executive control also included control over information.56
46. Id. at 2353 ("Bureaucratic expertise, for reasons I have indicated earlier, cannot
alone or even predominantly drive administrative decisions.").
47. Id. at 2356.
48. PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009).
49. Id. at 154.
50. See id. at 166-67 ("[T]he Clinton executive 'order process-without further
presidential control of subordinate administrators' discretion-represents the high-water mark of what
ought to be tolerable in terms of centralization.").
51. Id. at 155.
52. E.g., id. at 155-58.
53. Id. at 132.
54. Id. at 132-45. Signing statements are, in essence, presidential commentary on a
given bill that the President is signing. They can range from platitudinous praise of the enacted law to
serious interpretive, policy, or constitutional reservations. Shane readily admits that many individual
signing statements may have addressed executive authority on "obscure matters," but these stances "help[]
to maintain the attitudes-the norms of governance-that lead to other, more consequential claims of
unilateral executive authority." Id. at 142.
55. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 721 (2007).
56. SHANE, supra note 48, at 121-32.
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Like Clinton, Shane notes that the Bush Administration paid attention to
legal process and authority in its practice of presidentialism." However, Shane
argues that, at least under Bush, these processes to validate authority became
empty and formalistic. The President did not "claim[] to be above the law,"58 but
in the hands of Bush Administration lawyers, the law became mere "piece[s] of
paper ... to hold up as authoritative legal support for any claim of executive
authority." 59
At the most basic level, Kagan and Shane make the same descriptive point.
Kagan reveals how executive authority expanded during the Clinton years;
Shane illustrates how that expansion accelerated under Bush II. Shane argues
that, once the President is personally granted directive authority over the
administrative state, this expansion is inevitable. In his terms, presidentialism's
"usurpation of authority works as a one-way ratchet." 60 Regardless of party,
subsequent Presidents "will be tempted to embrace their predecessors' more
audacious claims as sources of legal authority and strike out on their own."61
Kagan may find an ideal balance in Clinton's presidentialism, but in Shane's
view, Kagan-style presidentialism necessarily accretes power, like a planet
gravitationally pulling in mass.
In the context of this ever-growing presidential power, Shane disputes
Kagan's normative arguments that presidentialism fosters effectiveness and
accountability. 6 2  On accountability, Shane brings a critical, realpolitik
perspective to Kagan's claim of "appropriation." According to Shane,
presidential administration becomes a means to use information control to thwart
accountability when politically advantageous. To this end, Shane describes the
Bush Administration's culture of secrecy around executive action, from
opposition to FOIA requests and assertions of executive privilege to purges of
government data and information. 63 The administration thus kept the public from
the information it needs to evaluate administrative policy. 6 4 Kagan concedes that
this could be a problem, but Shane views it as the norm.
57. E.g., id. at 112 (describing President Bush's claimed legal basis for enhanced
interrogation techniques and extraordinary rendition).
58. Id.at112.
59. Id. at 114.
60. Id. at 4; see also CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11
PRESIDENCY 663 (2015) ("[E]xecutive power tends to act like a ratchet: a president does something
unprecedented that seems like the new outer boundary, but then a successor treats that as a baseline and
goes even further.").
61. SHANE, supra note 48, at 4.
62. Separately from these policy arguments, he also argues that pluralism has a stronger
constitutional basis than unitarianism. Id. at 37-42. On unitary executive claims of authority beyond
Clintonian presidentialism, Kagan seemingly agrees. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2326-27. This paper does
not address these constitutional questions. The irresolvable debate over them is as prolific as the relevant
constitutional text is sparse.
63. SHANE, supra note 48, at 121-32; see id. at 157.
64. Id. at 165. Shane also contests the viability of the electoral link between the
President and the national populous that is central to the accountability claim. Id. at 161. However, his
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On efficacy, we think Shane can be read to make two primary points. First,
he argues that presidentialists fail to consider sufficiently the costs of presidential
involvement. As he writes, "the substantial regulatory delays entailed in White
House review impose billions of dollars of 'social cost'-a euphemism for the
illness, injuries, and even deaths that could have been forestalled had agencies
been permitted to proceed with greater independence." 65 In particular, despite
Kagan's exhortation against presidentialist intervention in scientific judgment,66
Shane argues that some of the most serious costs accrue from precisely that.67
Second, more broadly, Shane sees ever-growing presidential control as simply a
bad mechanism for decision-making. As he writes, in a passage that deserves full
quotation:
[L]ooking at the unilateral presidency in action shows us that the growth of
executive power is all too likely to produce dysfunctional government, no matter
which party is in control. Adopted as an ethos of government, aggressive
presidentialism breeds an insularity, defensiveness, and even arrogance within the
executive branch that undermines sound decision making, discounts the rule of
law, and attenuates the role of authentic deliberation in shaping political
outcomes.68
One imagines recent developments have only increased Shane's confidence
in this proposition.
As this Article moves to its case studies in Part IV, there will be multiple
opportunities to reflect on how recent events reinforce or weaken the
assumptions and arguments for Shane's pluralism or Kagan's presidentialism.
And we, like those authors, will doubtless find our analysis held hostage to the
presidential practices we choose to observe.
III. Separation of Powers vs. Separation of Parties
Competing theories of separation of powers are central to the presidentialist
and pluralist visions of presidential direction and control of administration. Most
arguments are similar to Kagan's misgivings on this point. The difference is she fails to see a better
alternative. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2336.
65. Id. at 173.
66. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2356.
67. SHANE, supra note 48, at 167 (describing "[t]he pressure on agency experts to
downplay the threat of global warming and White House intervention in the editing of documents to
portray the scientific consensus as weaker than it is . . . .").
68. Id. at 25. Cf Jack H. Knott & Gary J. Miller, When Ambition Checks Ambition:
Bureaucratic Trustees and the Separation ofPowers, 38 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 387, 401 (2008) (arguing
that administrators should act more like trustees than agents with respectto their delegated authority, since
"[tihe respect given to regulatory agencies is largely correlated with its demonstrated responsiveness to
professional norms and standards rather than its" immediate responsiveness to political pressure);
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1, at 2379 ("Politicization of the bureaucracy in the post-World War II era,
whatever its benefits in terms ofdemocratic accountability and political realism, has gradually eroded the
capacity ofbureaucratic institutions to check and balance unified party government. Perhaps constitutional
and administrative lawyers and theorists should take a closer look at what has been lost.").
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scholarship analyzing administrative and constitutional limits on presidential
administration features separation-of-powers concerns. 69  These concerns
respond to a basic feature of American political and constitutional ideology: the
belief that the separation-of-powers system is the central bulwark against
overweening governmental power and the destruction of individual liberty.70
From a comparative perspective, the fact of separated or unified powers
influences, even if it does not fully determine, the exercise of administrative
discretion. In his magisterial study of administrative control regimes in the
United Kingdom, United States and Australia, Professor Peter Cane argues that
"significant differences between control regimes" that check and channel
administration in the studied countries "may be. partly explicable in terms of
differences between the systems of government of' those countries (and that
comparative similarities in administrative control regimes likewise derive from
similarities in government systems).71 The "systems of government" that Cane
examines in detail are distinguished at a very general level by their tendency to
concentrate or diffuse political power. Cane explains this distinction in the
following terms:
A fundamental difference between diffusion and concentration is that under
diffusion, the various empowered institutions are separately and distinctly
authorized to exercise whatever powers they have been given, and are in that
sense 'coordinate.' By contrast, under concentration, authority is ultimately
derived from a single 'sovereign' institution to which all other institutions are in
some sense subordinate. For instance (as we will see in much more detail later),
in the U.S. system the three traditional branches of government-legislature,
executive and judiciary-are each understood to exercise power delegated to
them directly by 'the People,' in whom 'sovereignty' is said to reside. By contrast,
in the English system (in theory at least) 'sovereignty' resides in the Queen-in-
Parliament, and the authority of the executive and the judiciary is ultimately
subject to that sovereignty.7 2
The American belief in the efficacy of separation of powers to preserve
liberty and limit government is certainly plausible. So, indeed, is Professor
Cane's argument that control regimes with respect to administrative power are
explained, at least in part, by the degree of concentration or diffusion of power
69. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of
Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 519 (2015); see also John Ferejohn, Power in Public Law: Some
Reactions, 130 HARv. L. REv. F. 9, 17 (2016) ("The administrative state continually raises power-
separation issues."); Peter L. Strauss, PresidentialRulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 974-75, 979-
80 (1997) (discussing separation-of-powers issues in the rulemaking context).
70. This view was most famously promoted by James Madison in Federalist 51. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
71. PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2016).
72. Id. at 5.
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in the constitutional system generally. But these beliefs and arguments have not
gone unchallenged.
Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes, for example, argue that
separation of powers is, independent of divided government, functionally close
to meaningless in terms of explaining the degree of control exercised by
Congress over administration. On their view, contrary to the vision of the
Constitution's drafters,74 interbranch competition (and, thus, checking and
balancing) does not derive from inherent structural tension-what they call
"paper partition between the branches." Rather, any competition (or its
absence) is attributable to political alignment and opposition between branches.76
As they write, partisan identity between Congress and the President is
"sometimes more binding than law" and extends the President's "effective
control into branches of government other than his own."77
They largely reject the functional importance of branches as competing
institutions because "government institutions do not have wills or interests of
their own; their behavior is a product of the wills or interests that motivate the
individual officials who compose them."78 As the political parties to which those
individuals belong have become "more internally unified, ideologically
coherent, and polarized ... than we have seen in many decades,"7 9 partisan
allegiance supersedes any sense of institutional prerogative. In unified
government during this partisan age, Congress and the President will
"cooperat[e]" rather than compete.80 In terms of policy durability, unified
government is what potentially "offer[s] the prevailing party an opportunity to
build an enduring political consensus or movement of the sort that generates
historically dramatic change."81 Of course the converse is also true: divided
government has the opposite effect only because the separation of powers
facilitates division.
In evaluating Levinson and Pildes' claims, comparing the experience of the
later Obama and early Trump Administrations is especially instructive, since
they provide examples of both hyper-partisan divided and hyper-partisan unified
government. While Levinson and Pildes are certainly right that partisan division
or unity affects the efficacy of separation of powers as a control mechanism, this
73. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1; Levinson, supra note 20, at 90-91.
74. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1, at 2315 ("[T]he separation of powers no longer
works as originally envisioned because interbranch dynamics have changed with the rise of political
parties.").
75. Id. at 2314.
76. As they argue, the "invisibility of political parties" to judicial and scholarly
conceptions of separation of powers has seriously undercut the functional validity of those conceptions.
Id.
77. Id. at 2314-15 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610-11 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
78. Id.at2317.
79. Id. at 2338.
80.. Id.at2316.
81. Id. at 2340.
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Article's case studies suggest that separation of powers is not bereft of
institutional meaning.
First, a focus on hyper-partisanship ignores remaining ideological and
interest-based conflict within both parties. Second, while institutions themselves
do not have inherent interests, the structure of those institutions (and the
assumption of particular roles within those institutions) can still shape the
interests of officials. This premise takes us back to Professor Cane's comparative
work. As he notes, "even in periods of unified government, [American]
Presidents have significantly less control over Congress than Prime Ministers in
England and Australia typically enjoy over their respective Parliaments." 82 He
points to government structure in a broad sense-from the organization of
elections to the institutional role of the President relative to Congress-to explain
this comparative difference.8 3 This comparison arguably shows, in other words,
that institutional separation of powers still has importance in understanding the
practice and extent of presidential administration. That understanding must be
politically informed in a polity widely recognized to reflect increasing partisan
divisions, but checks on presidentialism are not wholly a function of partisan
competition.
Finally, the Levinson and Pildes analysis, focused as it was on the two
political branches, ignores the third branch of American government. In
particular, that analysis fails to note that the basic approach to judicial review of
administrative action in the United States reinforces congressional control-just
not necessarily the control of current congresses. In determining the legality of
administrative action, courts tend to ask a series of questions that treat the
legislative mandate under which an official acts as the critical touchstone for
administrative legitimacy. Courts ask whether the agency's approach flows from
a correct, or at least reasonable, construction of its organic statute. They ask, in
addition, whether the agency's fact-finding upon which its actions are predicated
address the relevant considerations-that is, the considerations made relevant by
the agency's statute. 84 In this way, the Judiciary reinforces the authority of
Congress as an institution, whatever the partisan composition of the current
Congress might be.
IV. Case Studies in Presidential Administration
We turn now to three policy case studies from the Obama and Trump
Administrations to provide specific contexts within which to assess the
82. CANE, supra note 71, at 107.
83. Professor Cane notes increased U.S. partisanship, in contrast to the increase in less
partisan pragmatism in the United Kingdom and Australia, may decrease the relative institutional friction
between a unified President and Congress. Id. at 110. However, we read his point here as a matter of
degree, rather than abrogating the overall comparative claim.
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contemporary state of presidential administration. Of course, the ink is still wet
on the history of the Obama years, and the experience of the Trump
Administration changes daily. Thus, these case studies are necessarily
preliminary, particularly with regard to President Trump.
A. Immigration Policy
Under both Obama and Trump (thus far), immigration policy has been a
major focus of presidential administration. Immigration enforcement policy
underwent major and well-publicized changes during President Obama's second
term, and President Trump was elected promising to undo those changes. It is
thus an ideal policy area in which to observe how presidential administration is
practiced in ideologically opposed administrations and to observe the durability
of independent presidential policymaking.
1. Obama: DACA & DAPA
In mid-June 2012, in the middle of his re-election campaign, President
Obama gave a speech from the Rose Garden to announce-one could say, in
Kagan's sense of the word, "appropriate"-what would be come to be known as
"DACA," Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.8 5 As the President explained,
DACA would formally defer deportation action against (and potentially give
legal work authorization to) certain young, undocumented immigrants who had
arrived in the United States as children and had not committed crimes. He
presented DACA as a "temporary stopgap" and called for congressional action
to codify the program.86 DACA represented the beginning of Obama's shift from
a presidential administration with the highest deportation rate in history to one
that aimed to narrow dramatically those subject to deportation.87
DACA was articulated in a memorandum from Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano to the Director of the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Director of the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), along with the Acting
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)." The complex
85. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President on
Immigration (June 15,2012), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-
president-immigration [http://perma.cc/H649-JW41]; Tom Cohen, Obama Administration To Stop
Deporting Some Young Illegal Immigrants, CNN (June 16, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/
politics/immigration [http://perma.cc/LGY7-3WUL].
86. Press Release, supra note 85.
87. See Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of
Immigrants Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013 [http://perma.cc/438T-
2PTS].
88. Memorandum from JanetNapolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar, Acting Comm., USCBP, et al. (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter DACA Memo],
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statutes governing immigration policy delegate the development of enforcement
authority to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, not the
President. The DACA memo was careful to frame the program as a non-binding
exercise of "prosecutorial discretion" vested in the DHS Secretary.89 Per
Obama's Rose Garden address, the memorandum instructed U.S. immigration
authorities to forebear enforcement against certain young, undocumented
immigrants.90 A memo, released the same day by the ICE Director to all ICE
employees, explained that employees should implement DACA by "exercis[ing]
their discretion, on an individual basis." 9 1 This focus on discretion and (at least
nominally) individual judgment by line officers was intended to avoid the claim
(which litigation over DACA ultimately sidestepped) 92 that in issuing this
guidance, DHS had in fact issued a rule that was invalid because it was not
adopted pursuant to the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act (the APA).93 Through the end of 2016, over 1.1 million immigrants would
receive deferred action under DACA.94
On November 20, 2014, President Obama again stepped to the podium to
make an appropriative announcement. This time it was to announce Deferred
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s 1 -exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-
as-children.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XUW-LMEH].
89. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President andImmigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 139-40 (2015) ("To underscore that the initiative fell within the President's
enforcement powers, the Administration emphasized that DACA would not confer a lawful status on its
recipients, that the adjudicators of DACA petitions in . . . USCIS . . . retained discretion to deny
applications of even those who satisfied the eligibility criteria, and that DHS retained the discretion to
terminate the status at any time.").
90. DACA Memo, supra note 88, at 1; Press Release, supra note 85.
91. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigration & Customs Enft, to All
Employees (June 15, 2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/s1-certain-young-people-
morton.pdf [http://perma.cc/5EQP-7ZJ7].
92. See Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O, 2013 WL 8211660, at *7 (N.D.
Tex. July 31, 2013); Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). The lower court sidestepped the
APA issue by finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; the appellate court likewise avoided the merits
by finding the plaintiffs lacked standing.
93. The APA provides certain "general law about administrative procedure and control"
that applies trans-substantively to the actions of federal agencies, in addition to any requirements in
agency-specific statutes. Whenever an agency acts, it must meet the applicable procedural standards that
the APA imposes. 1 CHARLEs H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE §
2:30 (2016). Under informal rulemaking, the agency must provide pre-promulgation notice in the Federal
Register of its proposed rulemaking, including "the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2018). Interested parties are then
allowed to respond with "data, views, or arguments" to the proposed rule. Id. § 553(c). After
"consideration of the relevant matter presented," the agency then publishes the final rule, along with "a
concise general statement of [its] . . .basis and purpose." Id. Courts can then review the agency's decision-
making process under the same "arbitrary [or] capricious" standard for general reasonableness review. Id.
§ 706(2)(A). Reviewing courts can vacate or otherwise remand a rule for failure to comply with these
APA requirements. Id. § 706(2)(D).
94. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Number of I-821D, Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status FY
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Action for Parents of Americans, "DAPA,"95 which expanded eligibility for
DACA and created a new deferred action program for undocumented parents of
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. Again, he presented his executive
action as something that legislation should supersede. 9 6 The potential DAPA-
eligible population-estimated at around four million undocumented
immigrants-was far larger than DACA." DAPA was again embodied in a
memorandum from the DHS Secretary addressed to the same high-level
immigration officials as the DACA memo.98 The memorandum instructed DHS
enforcement personnel to defer deportation action with respect to those
undocumented parents who had resided in the United States for a given amount
of time, provided there are no other grounds for believing that particular
individuals. should be an enforcement priority.
As with DACA, the DAPA memo was carefully phrased in terms of
discretion and (at least nominal) case-by-case adjudication99-an attempt to.
characterize DAPA's discretionary priorities like routine guidance concerning
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.100 Had the Secretary's memorandum
been viewed in that way, then no procedure would have been required to
promulgate it. Absent some violation of a statutory requirement that mandated
deportation of these undocumented aliens, the Secretary's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion would be, under standard doctrine, not subject to judicial
review.'0 1
But it is on this point that DAPA foundered in the courts. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that DAPA was not non-binding guidance (and therefore
exempt from APA rulemaking requirements),1 0 2 but a binding rule under the
95. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President in
Address to the Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration [http://perma.cc/RT38-J27P].
96. Id. ("I want to work with both parties to pass a more permanent legislative
solution. And the day I sign that bill into law, the actions I take will no longer be necessary.").
97. Press Release, Migration Pol'y Inst., As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized
Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation Under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program (Nov.
19, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many-37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-
get-relief-deportation-under-anticipated-new [http://perma.cc/KB57-BQ4P].
98. Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Le6n
Rodriguez, Dir., USCIS, et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memodeferred action.pdf [http://perma.cc/28LM-GBH3].
99. Id. at 5 ("[T]he ultimate judgment as to whether an immigrant is granted deferred
action will be determined on a case-by-case basis.").
100. Id. at 1 ("As is true of virtually every other law enforcement agency, DHS must
exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of the law.").
101. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding agency prosecutorial
discretion is presumptively unreviewable). Such exercises of discretion are sometimes referred to as black
or gray holes in administrative law, circumstances in which administrators act free, or almost free, from
any legal constraints. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095
(2009).
102. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012) (exempting "general statements of policy"
from notice and comment).
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APA.103 Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit adduced the President's own public
statements to support its finding that DAPA was meant to be binding. 10 4 As a
binding rule, DAPA was procedurally invalid for failure to follow the APA's
notice-and-comment rulemaking process. According to the Court of Appeals, the
finding that the Secretary's memorandum was, in fact, a rule in disguise had
substantive consequences as well. To adopt a rule, rather than merely exercise
discretionary authority to set enforcement priorities, the Secretary would need to
show that DHS had authority under existing immigration statutes to adopt rules
making certain categories of deportable aliens non-deportable and give reasons
for the exercise of that authority in this particular way.105 The court found no
such authority in the statute.1 06 The sitting, and often gridlocked, Congress could
not undo DAPA. But judicial review, predicated on an interpretation of the APA
and the immigration statutes as enacted by prior congresses, could do so.' 0 7
In timing and substance, the decisions to implement both DACA and
DAPA through executive action were politically and electorally informed. In
both cases, President Obama decided to implement the programs after a
gridlocked Congress failed to pass legislation resolving the issues that DACA
and DAPA addressed. For DACA, the precedent legislative failure was the
"DREAM Act,"108 which would have statutorily provided for DACA-like
deferred action for young, undocumented immigrants (often called Dreamers).' 09
Soon after the DREAM Act failed, Obama publicly disclaimed unilateral
executive authority to protect Dreamers. 10 Nevertheless, he announced DACA
"the summer before the 2012 presidential election, leading some commentators
to conclude the President's quest for .. . a strong showing among Latino voters
motivated the decision." 1
Similarly, Obama turned to DAPA when conservatives in the House
blocked a comprehensive immigration reform bill.1 12 When it "was clear that
103. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171-76 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
104. Id. at 173 ("In denying the government's motion for a stay of the injunction, the
district court further noted that the President had made public statements suggesting that in reviewing
applications pursuant to DAPA, DHS officials who 'don't follow the policy' will face 'consequences,'
and 'they've got a problem.').
105. Id. at 178-86.
106. Id.
107. We will not here discuss the problematic position of the Fifth Circuit in Texas v.
United States, 809 F.3d 134. Suffice it to say that reasonable and well-informed administrative lawyers
could disagree with virtually every finding in that opinion.
108. DREAM Act of2010, S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010), http://www.congress.gov/l11/
bills/s3992/BILLS-1 1s3992pcs.pdf [http://perma.cc/99PA-BLQ2].
109. Indeed, the DREAM Act's eligibility criteria were almost identical to DACA. Id.
§4.
110. See, e.g., SAVAGE, supra note 60, at 656; Josh Blackman, Presidential
Maladministration, U. ILL. L. REV. 61-62 (forthcoming 2018), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfim?
abstract id=2888172 [http://perma.cc/EP7A-NC6U].
111. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 89, at 218 n.317.
112. SAVAGE, supra note 60, at 656.
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Congress would not enact any immigration reform legislation before Obama's
presidency was over," 113 he decided to push his executive authority to the limits
of what his legal advisors would countenance as lawful. 1 14 As with DACA,
Obama had previously disclaimed the ability to implement a DAPA-type
program unilaterally." 5 This time, it is commonly believed that the Obama
Administration waited to announce DAPA until after the 2014 midterm
elections, to avoid harming Democratic candidates in districts unsympathetic to
leniency in immigration enforcement.' 16
But even if electoral politics influenced DAPA and DACA, both actions
still had serious legal reasoning and process behind them. As journalist Charlie
Savage wrote about DAPA, Obama's "policy-decision process,
characteristically, was heavily legalized." 17 The Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) had informally blessed DACA.' 1 8 In formulating DAPA,
White House counsel Neil Eggleston, OLC, and DHS lawyers collaborated on
the shape of the program. 119
The memorandum that OLC ultimately prepared concerning DAPA's
legality1 2 0 advised the Secretary that deferred action would be legally acceptable
only to the extent that the Secretary could find in legislation some close analogue
to the category of persons that the Secretary chose for deferral.1 2 1 In OLC's view,
such a case could be made for the DACA program, but not for all aspects of
DAPA, as the White House initially conceived of it. 122 Specifically, OLC found
113. Id. at661.
114. Juliet Eilperin et al., Obama's Evolution on Immigration, WASH. POST (Nov. 20,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obamas-evolution-on-immigration/2014/11/20/
856c5564-70d5-11e4-adl2-3734c46leab6 story.html [http://perma.cc/WW9Y-CCVC].
115. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President
at Univision Town Hall with Jorge Ramos and Maria Elena Salinas (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/20/remarks-president-univision-town-
hall-jorge-ramos-and-maria-elena-salina [http://perma.cc/STM5-JPBVJ (responding to a question of
whether he could provide deferred action for immigrant parents, President Obama said: "Now, what I've
always said is, as the head of the executive branch, there's a limit to what I can do . . . . [W]e're still
going to, ultimately, have to change the laws in order to avoid some of the heartbreaking stories that
you see coming up occasionally.").
116. Eilperin et al., supra note 114.
117. SAVAGE, supra note 60, at 661.
118. Blackman, supra note 110, at 62.
119. SAVAGE, supra note 60, at 661-62.
120. Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson, Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel,
to Jeh Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec. & W. Neil Eggleston, Counsel to the President (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-
prioritize-removal.pdf [http://perma.cc/5VDC-9N6A].
121. See id. at 24 ("[A]ny expansion of deferred action to new classes of aliens must be
carefully scrutinized to ensure that it . . . does not seek to effectively rewrite the laws to match the
Executive's policy preferences, but rather operates in a manner consonant with congressional policy
expressed in the statute."). But see Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 89, at 151 ("The appeal of the
congressional priorities approach is understandable. But we do not believe it provides an effective
principle for limiting executive branch enforcement judgments in immigration law and many other
domains. The congressional priorities approach fails because those priorities are a mirage.").
122. See Memorandum from Karl R. Thompson to Jeh Johnson, supra note 120, at 25-
33.
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sufficient statutory support for DAPA insofar as it deferred action for deportable
parents whose children were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, but not
for deportable parents whose children were themselves granted deferred action
under DACA. The Administration proceeded in accordance with OLC's
opinion. 123 The DAPA program thus both seized a prerogative previously said to
lie with Congress, but also respected congressional authority by limiting its reach
to categories of aliens favored by immigration statutes.
Professors Cox and Rodriguez recognized the importance of this rise of
presidentialism as administrative practice, arguing that "[t]he long-term trend in
American bureaucracy has been toward centralization ... elevating decisions
within agencies themselves, as well as above agencies into the Executive-Office
of the President."1 24 Moreover, they note that this shift has to some degree been
codified within immigration statutes, which over time have vested more
discretion and authority for immigration policy in the President and his
appointees. 12 5 This statutory authority, particularly as it involves enforcement
priorities, is what convinced the Obama Administration that it had legal authority
to implement DACA and DAPA. But as Cox and Rodriguez presciently noted,
this presidentialism in immigration allows "[a] single decision of a future
administration ... [to] reverse the non-enforcement decisions with respect to
millions of noncitizens." 26
2. Trump: The Travel Ban, DACA Retention & the Enforcement Boom
With the inauguration of President Trump, U.S. immigration policy shifted
radically, although not one immigration statute changed between the two
presidencies. 12 7 This Part will briefly describe three sets of immigration
developments under Trump: his "travel ban";' 2 8 his approach to DACA; and his
Administration's rapid and massive ramp-up of deportation-oriented
immigration enforcement.1 2 9
123. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson to Le6n Rodriguez, supra note 98, at 4-5.
124. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 89, at 184.
125. Id. at 194-95.
126. Id. at 208.
127. See Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Stoking Fears, Trump Defied
Bureaucracy To Advance Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/
2017/12/23/us/politics/trump-immigration.html [http://perma.cc/863K-MDGT].
128. The Trump Administration argues that the executive orders discussed here are not
instantiations of the "Muslim Ban" that Trump promised during his campaign. Ron Nixon & Nicholas
Kulish, Homeland Security Chief Admits Travel Ban Was Rushed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), http://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/us/travel-ban-customs-border-protection.html [http://perma.cc/2UDF-
EYBA]. We will refer to this policy as the travel ban, but we note the reasoning of Hawaii District Court
Judge Watson. Hawai'i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1135-36 (D. Haw. 2017).
129. We do not treat here the Trump Administration's attempt to combat so-called
"sanctuary cities," which Professor Strauss describes in his article. PETER L. STRAUSS, AMERICAN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNDER THE PRESIDENCY OF DONALD TRUMP 7 (May 2017) (on file with authors).
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First, the travel ban. Shortly after assuming office, President Trump held a
public signing ceremony for Executive Order 13,769 at the Pentagon. The venue
underscored the purported national security basis for the President's action.o
He described the Order as part of new vetting measures to keep "radical Islamic
terrorists" out of' the United States. 13 1 In its key provisions, the Order (i)
suspended essentially all immigration and alien travel from seven countries: Iraq,
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen;1 32 (ii) shut down all U.S. refugee
admissions for four months'33  (and all Syrian refugee admissions
indefinitely)1 3 4; and (iii) for future refugee admissions, instructed prioritization
for "refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based
persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in
the individual's country of nationality." 35 Unlike the DACA and DAPA memos,
the travel ban was not presented as agency-level guidance, but came as
instructions to agency heads directly from the President.
The world is familiar with what resulted."3 The nation's airports were filled
with "confusion and chaos and protests" as immigrants and refugees with
previously valid travel documents were detained at U.S. airports, while others
were prevented from boarding planes into the United States. 3 7 The chaotic
implementation stemmed at least in part from the furtive and rushed legal process
behind the order. Allegedly, neither the DHS secretary nor the Secretary of
Defense was involved in any legal review of the original EO.138 Instead, a "small
White House team" led by Steve Bannon drafted the Order in relative secrecy.1 3 9
Even Republican congressmen criticized the dearth of legal process. 40
In response to criticism, the White House alleged that OLC had blessed the
ban, but the OLC memo that they released-dated the same day that the Order
130. See Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7
Muslim Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-
syrian-refugees.html [http://perma.cc/C3KG-NDS5].
131. Id.
132. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,
Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, 8,978 § 3(c) (Feb. 1, 2017).
133. Id. § 5(a).
134. Id. § 5(c).
135. Id. § 5(b); see also Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2017),
reconsideration en banc denied, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 992527 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2017).
136. Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump's Rush to Enact an Immigration Ban
Unleashed Global Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics/
donald-trump-rush-immigration-order-chaos.html [http://perma.cc/23ZW-HZBS].
137. Yeganeh Torbati et al., Chaos, Anger as Trump Order Halts Some Muslim
Immigrants, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-chaos-
idUSKBN15COLD [http://perma.cc/Z2SD-2MQ7].
138. Shear & Nixon, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. See Peter Nicholas et al., Trump Team Kept Plan for Travel Ban Quiet, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-team-kept-plan-for-travel-ban-quiet-1485738314
[http://perma.cc/5YNH-YJDP].
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was signed-contained no legal analysis.14 ' It merely said the Order was
"approved with respect to form and legality,"14 2 which is perhaps best read as
stating the Order was validly structured and promulgated, rather than legally
sound in substance.1 43 This was Shane's waiving of legal papers in action.
Indeed, it seems doubtful that the OLC would have approved the ban's
application to legal permanent residents of the United States from the subject
countries. Presumably because the ban's application to those permanent
residents was clearly unlawful, DHS rushed to exempt them. 14 4 In a "highly
unusual" move, 14 5 the White House counsel issued "Authoritative Guidance"
that effectively amended the Order to exclude permanent residents.1 4 6
Executive Order 13,769 was subsequently enjoined by courtsl 47 and then
superseded by another Executive Order 4 8 (which was itself enjoined and, again,
superseded by a third Presidential Proclamation,1 4 9 which is itself, at printing,
subject to an injunction).150 The litigation over these Orders has been prolific,151
141. Laura Jarrett & Evan Perez, Internal Memo Shows Travel Ban Approved by DOJ
on Friday, CNN (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/02/politics/olc-memorandum-travel-ban
[http://perma.cc/4FNN-R2CB].
142. Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Proposed Executive Order Entitled, "Protecting the
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States", U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE 2 (Jan. 27, 2017),
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2017/images/02/02/eo.foreign.terrorist.entry.pdf [http://perma.cc/84G9-
GTQX].
143. Former Acting Attorney General Sally Yates seem to make this point in recent
congressional testimony. See Time, Sally Yates and Ted Cruz Have Heated Exchange over Donald
Trump's Travel Ban, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2017), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAD97EW5sz4
[http://perma.cc/M2JA-F3VG]. In any case, this curt OLC opinion offers an interesting point of contrast
with the DAPA OLC opinion.
144. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 85; Press
Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec'y John Kelly
on the Entry of Lawful Permanent Residents into the United States (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2017/01/29/statement-secretary-john-kelly-entry-lawful-permanent-residents-united-states [http://
perma.cc/J6AH-Q5AD].
145. Josh Gerstein & Matthew Nussbaum, White House Tweaks Trump's Travel Ban
To Exempt Green Card Holders, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/white-
house-green-card-holders-no-longer-covered-by-trump-executive-order- 2 34 50 5 [http://perma.cc/TEM5-
PE7Z].
146. Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn, Counsel to the President, to the Acting
Sec'y of State, the Acting Att'y Gen., and the Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000159-fb28-da98-a77d-fb7dbal70001 [http://perma.cc/GH8S-
A2MB].
147. Washington v. Trump,No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3,
2017).
148. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, Exec.
Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
149. Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into
the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, Pres. Proclamation No. 9,645, 82 Fed. Reg.
45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-09-27/pdf/2017-20899.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2KRX-N4UA].
150. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). This current
injunction is stayed pending appeal to the Supreme Court.
151. See Hawai'i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1123 n.4 (D. Haw. 2017) (non-
exhaustively cataloguing cases); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, vacated as moot, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th
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but we primarily want to highlight presidentialist-relevant reasoning from earlier
cases in this ongoing legal saga. These cases involve now-expired iterations of
the travel ban, but they are relevant for our purposes because they demonstrate
how courts wrestled with the ban's broad assertion of executive power.
First, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Washington v. Trump asserted two
limits on the president's directive authority. In defending the travel ban, the
Justice Department asserted that the President had "unreviewable authority" to
enact the ban. 15 2 Congress had statutorily delegated discretionary authority to the
President to bar "any aliens or any class of aliens" that he "finds ... would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States,"15 3 and the Justice Department
read this determination to be unreviewable. Although the relevant statute
delegates authority directly to the President,15 4 the Ninth Circuit sharply
disagreed. Even if it owed "substantial deference to the immigration and national
security policy determinations of the political branches," the court determined
that this act of presidential administration was still reviewable. 55
In demarcating between reviewable and unreviewable executive
immigration actions, the court echoed the reasoning of OLC's DAPA memo. It
distinguished the conclusion in Kleindienst v. Mandell5 6 that an executive
immigration action was unreviewable because "the Mandel standard applies to
lawsuits challenging an executive branch official's decision to issue or deny an
individual visa based on the application of a congressionally enumerated
standard to the particular facts presented by that visa application."' 57 By
contrast, the travel ban was "not about the application of a specifically
enumerated congressional policy," but was reviewable as a "promulgation of
sweeping immigration policy" and an "exercise[] of policymaking authority at
the highest levels of the political branches."'58 For the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, apparently the more ministerial the executive's immigration action-
that is, the greater degree to which it is premised upon relatively specific
statutory standards-the less reviewable. But bolder presidential administration,
by virtue of its basis in vague congressional standards (here, the language is the
large and loose "detrimental to the interests of the United States"), is subject to
more searching judicial review.
This reasoning is questionable, to say the least. In general terms,
administrative law doctrine looks in the opposite direction: the broader the
Cir. 2017); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (May
31,2017), vacatedandremanded, Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
152. Emergency Motion for Defendant-Appellants at 2, Washington v. Trump, 847
F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105).
153. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2018).
154. This helps explain why the ban was issued as an executive order rather than as a
DHS document.
155. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017).
156. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
157. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162.
158. Id.
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discretion conferred, the less administrative action is subject to judicial
review." 9 The Justice Department was not making a frivolous argument when it
claimed that statutory language as vague as "detrimental to the interests of the
United States" delegates political judgment to a political branch of the
government and that the courts have no workable standard against which to judge
whether the President's determination is correct. However, the Justice
Department made a further and much less plausible argument that these
judgments were not reviewable even for constitutionality. And the Ninth Circuit
had no difficulty dispensing with that argument.1 60 The plaintiffs had claimed,
among other constitutional violations, that the Trump EO, both in its original
incarnation and in its second revised version, was predicated on an intent to
discriminate against Muslims in violation of the First Amendment.
Subsequently, the Hawaii district court enjoined the second Order precisely
because it was so directly connected to the President's political statements based
in unconstitutional religious animus. In finding that the second Order was
intended as the discriminatory "Muslim Ban" that Trump had promised on the
campaign trail (and that the second order was not different from the first in this
regard), the court catalogued statements from the President and his advisors that
strongly supported this finding. 16 1 The court argued that "[a]ny reasonable,
objective observer would conclude" that "[t]hese plainly-worded statements ...
betray the Executive Order's stated secular purpose." 62
The Ninth Circuit largely upheld this second injunction. 16 3 But notably, it
turned away from the lower court's reasoning based on political statements and
fraught constitutional questions. Instead, it issued a per curiam opinion based
(facially) on more technical statutory interpretation. 16 4 That Ninth Circuit shift
contrasts sharply with the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of an injunction against
the second EO.165 Echoing the district court in Hawaii, the Fourth Circuit
focused on President Trump's pre- and post-inauguration political statements, as
well as statements by those in the President's political orbit, while deciding the
case on constitutional grounds.' 6 6 As the Fourth Circuit explained, "Just as the
reasonable observer's 'world is not made brand new every morning,' nor are we
159. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988).
160. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1163-64.
161. Hawai'i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1136-37 (D. Haw. 2017).
162. Id. at 1136.
163. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017).
164. See Leah Litman, See You in Court: Ninth Circuit Round 2, TAKE CARE (June 12,
2017), http://takecareblog.com/blog/see-you-in-court-ninth-circuit-round-2 [http://perma.cc/5P2X-
75PA].
165. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), as
amended (May 31, 2017), vacated and remanded, Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct.
353 (2017).
166. Id. Judge Thacker argued in a concurrence that the necessary religious purpose
could be found if only post-inauguration statements were considered. 857 F.3d at 631-32 (Thacker, J.,
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able to awake without the vivid memory of these [political] statements. We
cannot shut our eyes to such evidence when it stares us in the face."' 6 7
We should be clear that presidential directives and administrative actions
are not invalid simply because politics motivate them. Whatever the merits of
the Fourth Circuit and Hawaii district court's conclusions about the political
motivations behind the EOs, Professor Strauss is right to call their judicial
approach "a remarkable step."168 So long as officials can give credible
explanations of their actions based in statutory authority, that Republican or
Democratic administrations arrive at differing policy decisions is irrelevant. The
problem with the Trump EOs, as the Ninth Circuit thoroughly described in
Washington, was that they simply recited the need to protect against terrorism
while offering no evidence or reasoning that connected the ban to realistic safety
concerns. 1 69 The second Ninth Circuit opinion in Hawaii further cemented this
judicial focus on statutorily required evidence and reasoning, rather than
campaign rhetoric. To keep electoral promises through presidential
administration is not illegal. But the Constitution and statutes constrain what
promises can be kept. Congress delegated the power, and it must be exercised
for the purposes that motivated the delegation.
If politics in a sense initially undid the Trump executive travel ban, it also
seems to have stymied his promise to undo DACA. As Professors Cox and
Rodriguez recognized,1 70 the moment Trump took office, he could void the over
one-million DACA grants with the stroke of a pen. As a candidate, he promised
to do as much.171 What's curious is that Trump did not do so for quite some time;
in fact, he expressed a hesitancy to eliminate the program.1 72 Initially, his DHS
Secretary explicitly left the DACA memo in place, even as he rescinded other
167. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 599.
168. Strauss, supra note 129, at 6. A dissent in the case lambasted this approach. Int'l
Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 649 (Niemeyer, J. et al., dissenting) ("The majority's new rule,
which considers statements made by candidate Trump during the presidential campaign to conclude that
the Executive Order does not mean what it says, is fraught with danger and impracticability.").
Conservative legal authorities have done the same. E.g., David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Fourth
Circuit Joins the 'Resistance,' WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-fourth-
circuit-joins-the-resistance-1496071859 [http://perma.cc/9TMB-FKF8].
169. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168 (9th Cir. 2017).
170. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 89, at 208 ("A single decision of a future
administration could reverse the nonenforcement decisions with respect to millions of noncitizens.").
171. Cindy Carcamo, Beneficiaries of Obama's Immigration Relief Worry About
Future Under Trump, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/califomialla-ma-daca-
recipients-face-uncertain-future-201611 10-story.html [http://perma.cc/2KF7-ZG85]; Nick Gass, Trump
Rips Obama, Clinton After Supreme Court Immigration Decision, POLITICO (June 23, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/trump-immigration-supreme-court-224736 [http://perma.cc/
Z4AY-AEVY].
172. Transcript of AP interview with Trump, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 23, 2017),
http://www.apnews.com/c810d7de280a47e88848b0ac74690c83 [http://perma.cc/8HMW-HHCC]
(reporting Trump's statement that "[tihe dreamers should rest easy"); Mark Hensch, Steve King 'Very
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Obama-era immigration guidance.1 7 3 For months, the situation was day-to-
day, 1 74 and Attorney General Sessions expressed a willingness to deport DACA
beneficiaries and to potentially end the program altogether.'7 5 It may be that
Trump initially wished to avoid the political liability of full-on DACA
elimination, which would bring brutal scenes of children, teenagers, and young
adults being deported to countries they may not even remember.
Even after Trump decided to end DACA (with Attorney General Sessions
announcing the decision),17 6 Trump has struggled politically with eliminating it
(and even implied that he would somehow retain DACA if Congress failed to
codify its protections into law).' 7 7 At writing, it remains uncertain if Congress or
the President will act.
By contrast, the Trump Administration managed, within just a year, to
effect a rapid, massive ramp-up of immigration enforcement. Indeed, this
enforcement ramp-up may be one of the Administration's biggest successes in
terms of accomplishing its stated policy goals. This reorientation began with two
other Executive Orders on immigration,178 both of which the DHS Secretary has
interpreted and operationalized in subsequent guidance.1 7 9 These Orders and
173. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm., USCBP, et al. 2 (Feb. 20, 2017), http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/defaultifiles/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-
National-Interest.pdf[http://perma.cc/EEA8-LFGW] [hereinafter Kelly Memo 1]; see also Ted Hesson &
Seung Min Kim, Wary Democrats Look to Kelly for Answers on Immigration, POLITICO (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/wary-dems-look-to-kelly-for-answers-on-immigration-236673
[http://perma.cc/9YQP-4CGF] ("Of the DACA program, Kelly said both the government and individuals
have an obligation to honor the terms of the policy. 'The DACA status is a commitment, not only by the
government towards the DACA person, or the so-called Dreamer, but by that person to obey the law,'
Kelly said.").
174. Ted Hesson, DACA Still 'Under Review,' Trump Administration Says, POLITICO
(June 16, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/16/trump-daca-immigration-deportation-relief-
program-239654 [http://perma.cc/SMK7-SR5G]; Ted Hesson, Kelly Won't Commit To Defending DACA
in Court, POLITICO (July 12, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/12/john-kelly-daca-legal-
challenge-240470 [http://perma.cc/HP8A-QMMB].
175. Michael Tan, Are States Coordinating With the Trump Administration To Take
Down DACA? We Aim To Find Out, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.aclu.org/
blog/speak-freely/are-states-coordinating-trump-administration-take-down-daca-we-aim-find-out
[http://perma.cc/9GAS-EQQC] Ted Hesson, Sessions: 'We Can't Promise' DREAMers Won't Be
Deported, POLITICO (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/jeff-sessions-dreams-
deported-237369 [http://perma.cc/BM2H-83AG].
176. Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice, to Elaine Duke,
Acting Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/99465l/
download [http://perma.cc/2U7F-2MX3].
177. Sophie Tatum, Trump: I'll 'Revisit'DACA If Congress Can't Fix in 6 Months, CNN
(Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/donald-trump-revisit-daca/index.html [http://
perma.cc/JUB3-J43D].
178. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No.
13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 30, 2017); Border Security and Immigration Enforcement, Exec. Order
No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
179. Kelly Memo 1, supra note 173; Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec'y, Dep't of
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agency guidance, among other changes, vastly expand the number of
undocumented immigrants who are deemed deportation priorities; begin a hiring
surge of 15,000 immigration and border patrol agents; expand cooperation with
local and state law enforcement to assist in immigration enforcement; and
increase the use of so-called "expedited removal," which provides for
deportation without a hearing before an immigration judge.so The Trump
Administration has also pulled back on grants of temporary legal status to groups
of Haitian' 8 1 and El Salvadorian immigrants,1 8 2 among others.
While the travel ban was initially mired in litigation, these operational
changes began with relatively little legal challenge. To anyone watching, the
tenor and aggressiveness of immigration enforcement has immediately changed.
Enforcement statistics are reflecting this shift.'83 Moreover, immigration patterns
across the southern border seem to be responding to Trump's rhetorical and
operational shifts.1 84
In the abstract, one would assume that Obama would have had an easier
time implementing non-enforcement than Trump would have ratcheting up
enforcement, especially since non-enforcement is far less susceptible to judicial
review. But to date, the opposite has been the case.
So why has the enforcement ramp-up been so successful? First, these
changes are much less visible than the travel ban. They involve operational
180. See Camila Domonoske, What's New in Those DHS Memos on Immigration
Enforcement?, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/516649344/
whats-new-in-those-dhs-memos-on-immigration-enforcement [http://perma.cc/PPK5-QZNR]. On the use
of expedited removal by the Trump administration, see Jill E. Family, Due Process Sleight ofHand, YALE
J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 21, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/due-process-sleight-of-hand-by-
jill-e-family/ [http://perma.cc/H93C-45QA].
181. Miriam Jordan, Trump Administration Ends Temporary Protection for Haitians,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/haitians-temporary-status.html
[http://perma.cc/W5DK-UPPU].
182. Miriam Jordan, Trump Administration Says that Nearly 200,000 El Salvadorians
Must Leave, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/us/salvadorans-tps-
end.html [http://perma.cc/NF39-WW5V].
183. Agency Release, Immigration & Customs Enft, ICE ERO Immigration Arrests
Climb Nearly 40% (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.ice.gov/features/100-days [http://perma.ccl7R54-JJ2C];
Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Return to Rule of Law in Trump Administration
Marked by Increase in Key Immigration Statistics (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/return-
rule-law-trump-administration-marked-increase-key-immigration-statistics [http://perma.cc/932G-
7FM8]; Caitlin Dickerson, Immigration Arrests Rise Sharply as a Trump Mandate Is Carried Out, N.Y.
TIMES (May, 17, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/immigration-enforcement-ice-
arrests.html [http://perma.cc/G3SE-EN4W]; Geneva Sands, Immigration-RelatedArrests byICEIncrease
Under President Trump, ABCNEWS (Apr. 17, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/US/immigration-related-
arrests-ice-increase-president-trump/story?id=46847044 [http://perma.cc/SB8Q-HN7A].
184. See Nick Miroff, Arrests Along Mexico Border Drop Sharply Under Trump, New
Statistics Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
arrests-along-mexico-border-drop-sharply-under-trump-new-statistics-show/2017/12/05/743c6b54-
d9c7-lle7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html [http://perma.cclDA2R-SXC9]; David Nakamura, Amid
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policy choices that are, generally speaking, far less susceptible to judicial
review.18 5 They do not change anyone's legal status, and some, like the hiring
surge, seem to be routine managerial decisions. To be. sure, expedited removal
may be challenged in individual cases, but whether any due process or statutory
procedural rights have been infringed will depend on the particular
circumstances surrounding those cases.
Second, these enforcement initiatives seem aligned with general policy
preferences up and down the immigration and homeland security bureaucracy,
from the President's top political appointees to line officers. To begin at the top,
Trump has appointed immigration hardliners who have zealously implemented
his immigration agenda-particularly Attorney General Jeff Sessions. In turn,
Attorney General Sessions has considerable authority over the immigration
judges who hear deportation cases. This operational authority limits the degree
to which resistance might emerge in individual administrative proceedings.' 86
Moving down the chain of command, civil servants in the immigration
enforcement bureaucracy seem to be, generally speaking, sympathetic to these
enforcement policies. During the election, the union for ICE employees endorsed
Trump-the first endorsement the union has ever made.187 By contrast, the
Obama Administration struggled to temper immigration enforcement at first, at
least in part because Obama's more lenient enforcement policies cut against the
policy preferences of the immigration bureaucracy. 88  ICE employees
themselves sued to invalidate DACA. 18 9 Presidential administration starts at the
top, and the Sessions appointment illustrates the strong association between
effective presidential administration and the President's power to appoint high-
level administrative officials. But Trump's enforcement ramp-up also shows
how the views and sympathies of the civil service can have a major impact on
the speed and efficacy of implementation.
3. Preliminary Thoughts on Immigration Presidentialism
Viewing these successes and failures of the Obama and nascent Trump
Administrations under the presidentialist lens, a few key points come into focus.
First, Shane's "one-way ratchet" seems to be working to propel the ever more
185. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61-67 (2004) (finding agency
discretion as to "broad, programmatic" policy choices to be generally unreviewable under the APA).
186. See Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to
the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 KAN. L. REv. 541, 542-44 (2011).
187. ICE Union Endorses Trump, POLITICO (Sept. 26,2016), http://www.politico.com/
story/2016/09/immigration-customs-enforcement-union-endorses-trump-228664 [http://perma.cc/
D9KW-SGQZ].
188. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 89, at 191-92 (describing ICE agents as
"extremely resistant" to pre-DACA/DAPA policy guidance from the Obama Administration, with
"discontent [that] ultimately bubbled up through the employees' union").
189. See supra note 92.
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prevalent use of presidential directive authority.1 90 The boldness of presidential
assertions of power have even begun to trouble even strong unitarian theorists
like Professor John Yoo.19' It seems almost quaint that, fifteen years ago, Kagan
made waves by advocating strong presidential directive authority. Indeed, the
general public-influenced, to be sure, by the way the press reports
administrative actions-now seems to assume an identity between the President
and administration. The Democratic health plan was Obamacare, even if the
Obama Administration left much of the ACA's substance to be ironed out by its
legislative sponsors; the ill-fated Republican health plan is Trumpcare, even if
Trump had little interest in the legislation's details. The public may not only
assume presidentialism, but demand it. Both political parties claim executive
overreach when the other controls the White House, but either side's political
base would likely be furious if its President refused to assertively direct and
control administration.
Second, even as this presidential mode is ascendant, both Obama and
Trump encountered some legal anxiety over ever-stronger presidential
administration. Both the DAPA OLC opinion and the federal courts in the Texas,
Hawaii, and Washington judicial opinions refused to give either administration
unchecked power to unilaterally implement sweeping policy when that policy
was not sufficiently tethered to congressional priorities, as embodied in statute.
These exercises of presidential authority are becoming so massive that judges
are willing, at least to a certain extent, to overcome presumptions of non-
reviewability of executive enforcement policies and extreme deference to
executive judgments concerning national security. DAPA was easily
characterized as a discretionary non-enforcement decision that is normally
unreviewable. Recharacterizing it as a rule was a relatively aggressive exercise
of judicial review, as was the invalidation of Trump's travel ban based on
motivation evidenced by campaign statements. How much separation of powers,
as enforced by an independent judiciary, will limit Trump Administration
policymaking remains to be seen.
One also sees contrasts among various immigration initiatives in the
relative attention to process and established administrative norms and
institutions. One would expect some correlation between process and policy
durability,' 9 2 and indeed, the travel ban's failed rollout seems like it was largely
a function of inadequate process (legally. as well as politically).' 9 3 Shane
190. See SHANE, supra note 48, at 4.
191. John Yoo, Executive Power Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), http://
www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/opinion/executive-power-run-amok.html [http://perma.cc/78DR-66PF].
192. Cf Chen, supra note 188, at 352 ("Without discounting the importance of political
accountability, this Article suggests that perfecting procedure is an important component of the expertise
that legitimates agency action.").
193. Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits referenced process issues in upholding
injunctions against the ban. Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-15589, 859 F.3d 741, 756 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting
the first EO was promulgated "without interagency review"); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
857 F.3d 554, 596 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (May 31, 2017) ("The Government's argument that EO-
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bemoans the empty formalism of executive legal process and authority for
presidentialism, but the travel ban experience to date shows that internal
executive legal processes can mean something. We are doubtful that the Trump
Executive Orders would have emerged in the form that they did had there been
serious involvement from OLC. But process and professionally competent
lawyering are not magic shields against legal invalidation. Obama tried to
rationalize his extensions of executive power in DAPA through heavy attention
to legal processes and norms, 194 but that ultimately failed to save the policy.
As a separation-of-powers matter, both Trump and Obama's major
immigration actions have been unilateral, despite the unified government under
Trump (and divided one under Obama). In the separation-of-parties model, one
might expect Trump to request that a Republican Congress revamp immigration
policy legislatively to make his changes more enduring. (That may change to a
certain degree if a DACA deal is consummated, but that would be more the
exception than the rule.) But Congress is a sluggish institution at best. And many
congressional Republicans, as shown by their voting records, are supportive of
more centrist immigration reform. Under the current Congress, if Trump's
overarching immigration policies were embodied in legislation, we doubt they
would pass. 195 There are policy disagreements beneath the sharp partisanship in
D.C. and those disagreements manifest themselves institutionally. A Democratic
Congress may not have been able to counter Trump's immigration initiatives
effectively, but a Republican Congress is not lending strong support. Separation
of powers retains some operational meaning, notwithstanding unified
government.
Finally, the Obama and Trump experiences with respect to immigration
policy also have something to say about appropriation and accountability.
Undoubtedly, both Presidents "owned" their executive actions in some sense. As
evidenced in judicial opinions striking down both DAPA and the travel ban, we
have even seen the potential legal downside of "appropriation," the possibility
that administrative action will be judged based on how the President portrays the
policy in his political appropriation of it, both before and after implementation. 196
On the other hand, ownership or appropriation, at least in Kagan's sense,
does not always translate straightforwardly into electoral accountability. Obama
2's primary purpose is related to national security ... is belied by evidence in the record that President
Trump issued the First Executive Order without consulting the relevant national security agencies .. "),
vacated and remanded, Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
194. SAVAGE, supra note 60, at 661.
195. Some limited, Trumpian immigration bills have at least passed the House,
however. See Emmarie Huetteman & Nicholas Kulish, House Passes 2 Strict Immigration Bills, at
Trump's Urging, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/us/politics/house-
passes-strict-immigration-bills-at-trumps-urging.htmi [http://perma.cc/ZQB5-L38G].
196. E.g., Matt Zapotosky, Judges Take Trump at His Word-and That's Not Been
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announced DACA before the 2012 election presumably because it was to his
advantage, and he seemingly delayed DAPA in a failed attempt to improve his
party's electoral chances in the subsequent political cycle. Currying favor with
particular constituencies and avoiding political backlash are in some sense tied
to electoral accountability. But neither has the democracy-reinforcing resonance
that permeates Kagan's normative case for presidentialism.
Kagan's view of the positive accountability role of presidential media
coverage has also proved to be too optimistic. This stems in. part from the
development of hyper-partisan media outlets. President Trump's first one
hundred days have been a failure or a success depending on which press outlets
are consulted. And President Obama was a courageous and progressive leader or
a scofflaw in his immigration actions in much the same way. Shane's more
skeptical, pluralist view of the political media is undoubtedly the more accurate
one. Politics has always been blood sport, but when Kagan wrote her apologia,
norms of presidential transparency and press political neutrality were, in many
senses, far stronger. Those norms seem necessary to the proper functioning of
presidential accountability mechanisms.197 In terms of twenty-first century
media and democratic accountability, one wonders if Kagan had been able, in
2001, to "read / the book of fate, / And see the revolution of the times . .. "198
whether she would be quite so dismissive of Madisonian concerns over executive
power. 199
B. Climate Change
Climate change is another policy area that, for the Obama and early Trump
presidencies, has been largely defined through presidential administration.
Chiefly in the second half of his presidency, President Obama attempted to
address climate change through a sweeping set of executive actions, and the
Trump Administration's push to roll back those actions has been intense and
rapid.
1. Obama: The CPP & the Paris Agreement
In his first term, President Obama made an abortive push for congressional
action on climate change, with the failed "Waxman-Markey" cap-and-trade bill
to limit domestic greenhouse gas emissions. 20 0 Legislative action subsequently
197. This would also apply to congressional accountability. Pluralism is generally on
shaky ground if we are truly in an era of post-truth politics.
198. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 3,
sc. 1.
199. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2345-46.
200. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009); see also JONATHAN CHAIT, AUDACITY: How
BARACK OBAMA DEFIED HIS CRITICS AND CREATED A LEGACY THAT WILL PREVAIL 120-24 (2017). For
a brief description of the Waxman-Markey and its merits, see Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or
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became impossible, given the opposition of Democrats in oil and coal-heavy
states, as well as increasingly widespread climate change denial within the GOP.
In the years after that legislative failure, the Obama Administration crafted an
audacious executive agenda to combat climate change. That agenda included
domestic regulatory efforts to curb emissions from power plants and vehicles;
international negotiations on emissions limits; and efforts to order the operation
of the federal government to account for climate change-from budgetary
requests and environmental planning to cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking.20 1 A
full account of these efforts is beyond this Article's scope. This Section will
focus solely on President Obama's signature domestic regulatory action on
climate-the Clean Power Plan-and his signature international achievement-
the Paris Agreement.
The Clean Power Plan (CPP) was a bold attempt to use EPA authority under
the Clean Air Act to substantially reduce carbon emissions from existing power
plant infrastructure.20 2 Electricity generation from power plants produces around
thirty percent of U.S. carbon emissions,203 which is why the CPP was central to
the Obama climate strategy. 2 0 4 The CPP set national targets for improved carbon
efficiency of power generation, starting in 2022, and requiring the attainment of
final efficiency goals by 2030.205 Based on these national targets, the EPA
devised state-level efficiency targets, and under the CPP, each state would be
required to formulate a plan to meet its target.206 The EPA projected a thirty-two
percent reduction in CO2 emissions from electricity generation if, through state-
by-state effort, these national goals were met. 20 7
Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
245, 284-92 (2010).
201. For a superb description of these efforts, with a focus on the last category, see
Yumehiko Hoshijima, Note, Presidential Administration and the Durability of Climate-Consciousness,
127 YALE L.J. 170 (2017).
202. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015)
203. Inventory of US. Greenhouse Gas Emissions andSinks: 1990-2014, ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY 2-22 (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-04/documents/us-ghg-
inventory-2016-main-text.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y8P4-943C]
204. President Obama undertook complementary efforts to curb emissions from new
power plants and non-stationary sources. On new power plants, see Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-10-
23/pdf/2015-22837.pdf [http://perma.cc/GUN9-7QXH]. The Obama Administration promulgated various
fuel efficiency rules for different vehicle types, but for a compelling description of how the Administration
promulgated its initial fuel economy standards for cars and light trucks, see Jody Freeman, The Obama
Administration's National Auto Policy: Lessons from the "Car Deal," 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343
(2011).
205. JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R44341, EPA's CLEAN POWER
PLAN FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 15 tbl.1 (2016).
206. Id. at 17-18 tbl.2.
207. Id. at 12.
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The CPP was notable for the flexibility it provided states in how they could
work to comply with the emissions targets over a long time horizon.20 8 While the
EPA provided what it called "building blocks" of carbon efficiency to calculate
its goals, states would be free to formulate their own strategies to meet the EPA's
performance standards. 2 09 The final CPP also allowed states to trade emissions
allowances among themselves. 2 10
The CPP began to take its earliest shape in 2013, when the Obama White
House released its "Climate Action Plan," 2 11 a document that broadly described
the White House's overall vision for climate policy, from emissions reduction to
infrastructure resiliency. In the Action Plan, the first listed priority for emissions
reduction was power plant emissions.212 As anticipated by the Action Plan,
President Obama published a classically Clintonian presidential directive that
ordered the EPA Administrator to promulgate what would become the CPP.2 13
In that directive, the President provided high-level policy guidance that
foreshadowed the flexible, state-centric, performance-based nature of the
finalized CPP. 2 1 4
Intense legal fighting over the CPP's validity began soon after it was
promulgated in late 2015. The Republican-controlled Senate attempted to use the
Congressional Review Act-a congressional tool for voiding newly promulgated
regulations that is discussed infra21 5 -to invalidate the CPP, but Obama vetoed
that effort.216 Numerous states and other litigants sued in the D.C. Circuit to
invalidate the CPP on various environmental and administrative law grounds,
with those cases consolidated into West Virginia v. EPA. 2 17 That years-long legal
battle was still unresolved at the end of the Obama Administration. However,
early in the West Virginia case, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court
for a preliminary injunction of the CPP while the litigation continued. In an
208. CHAIT, supra note 200, at 128-30.
209. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 205, at 15.
210. Robert Sussman, Obama's Final Clean Power Plan: Merging Strong Climate Goals
with Flexible implementation, BROOKINGS INST.: PLANET POLICY (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/
planetpolicy/2015/08/04/obamas-final-clean-power-plan-merging-strong-climate-goals-with-flexible-
implementation [http://perma.cc/8PNK-A5XG].
211. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (June
2013), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf
[http://perma.cc/K4WR-BX28].
212. Id. at 6.
213. Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,535, 39,535-36 § 1(b)
(July 1, 2013), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-07-01/pdf/2013-15941.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4TAJ-HPV9]
214. Id. § 1(c).
215. See infra Section IV.C.2.
216. Memorandum of Disapproval on S.J. Res. 24, The White House (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/19/memorandum-disapproval-sj-res-24
[http://perma.cc/R46U-PN2V].
217. West Virginia v. EPA, (No. 15-01363) (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015). See generally
LINDA TSANG & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RES. SERV., R44480, CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL
BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA (Mar. 8, 2017).
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"unprecedented" move,218 the Court granted the stay, in a 5-4 vote.219 The
Supreme Court "had never before granted a request to halt a regulation before
review by a federal appeals court." 220 The obvious conclusion was that five
Justices were already predisposed to invalidate the CPP, even before the D.C.
Circuit had ruled. When Justice Scalia passed away just days after voting for the
CPP stay,22 1 it soon became clear that the next President would pick the Supreme
Court Justice who could effectively decide the case.
We will return to the CPP's fate when we discuss President Trump's
climate policy, but for now, we turn to the signature international achievement
of Obama's climate agenda: the Paris Agreement.222 The Paris Agreement was
finalized in late 2015, when 196 countries accepted the Agreement's core goal:
to "[h]old[] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 20 C
above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase
to 1.5 0 C above pre-industrial levels." 223 To achieve this goal, the Paris
Agreement "adopt[ed] a 'bottom-up' framework, meaning that all parties
independently determine how much they will reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions." 224 The Paris Agreement is like an international version of the CPP.
But whereas the EPA set binding efficiency targets for American states, nation-
states under the Paris Agreement decided their own emissions targets-
"Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)"22 5-in light of that
global 20 C performance goal. These INDCs would not be "legally binding"
under the Agreement, but nations would be bound "to report their commitments
and steps taken toward[] implementation." 226 The CPP was the centerpiece of
Obama's plan to achieve the United States' INDC toward the Paris Agreement's
warming limit.
While Obama oriented U.S. climate policy toward the Paris Agreement's
goals, the Agreement "states no legally binding emissions caps, declaring only
that member states 'should' meet such targets," while "those relatively few
'legally binding provisions [included in the Paris Agreement] are largely
218. Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama's Efforts
To Regulate CoalEmissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/
supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html [http://perma.cc/WE8X-3QD5].
219. Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.).
220. Liptak & Davenport, supra note 218.
221. And Senate Republicans declined to provide a hearing for any appointee that
President put forward.
222. Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104, http://unfccc.int/files/
essential background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/D7KQ-
79YV].
223. Id. § 1(a).
224. United States Joins Consensus on Paris Climate Agreement, 110 AM. J. INT'L L.
374, 374 (2016) [hereinafter United States Joins].
225. Id. at 375.
226. Id. at 374; see also Paris Agreement, supra note 222, at § 4.2 ("Each Party shall
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procedural in nature and in many instances are duplicative of existing U.S.
obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,"' 2 27 a
treaty the U.S. Senate ratified in 1992.
The Obama Administration needed this legal combination in the Paris
Agreement-nonbinding commitments that Obama could implement
domestically pursuant to his existing regulatory authority, along with binding
commitments based in existing treaty law-to allow him to accede to the treaty
unilaterally, without congressional approval.22 8 At the time of its adoption, the
Paris Agreement could not, as a political matter, pass the Senate as a treaty (or
the House and Senate as a congressional-executive agreement). 2 29 Thus, while
negotiating in Paris, "as a matter of U.S. law, the administration sought an
executive agreement," which the President can make unilaterally, "rather than an
Article II treaty." 2 3 0 According to Professor Harold Koh, the Paris Agreement
was a lawful act of purely presidential administration-despite its epochal
importance-because, in part, America's commitments (binding and
nonbinding) were reflected in "preexisting domestic legal obligations,"
including a prior Article II treaty.231
As Professor Jack Goldsmith has written, the Paris Agreement was
emblematic of "the Obama administration's defining legacy" in international
lawmaking 232: a "cobbling together [of] tools that significantly expanded the
President's power to make international agreements without Congress' consent,
and sometimes in the face of clear congressional opposition." 2 3 3 The Paris
Agreement was presidentialism in international law-bold and aggressive
executive action in the face of congressional gridlock. Obama was historically
unsuccessful at securing congressional approval of treaties, 23 4 so he pulled
227. Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych 's End: A Better Framework To Evaluate 21st
Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J.F. 338, 352 (2017) (quoting Michael J. Mattler,
Observations on Recent U.S. Practice Involving Treaties and Other International Agreements and
Arrangements 2 (Oct. 15, 2016) (unpublished paper presented at 2016 Yale-Duke Foreign Relations Law
Roundtable)).
228. United States Joins, supra note 224, at 377-78 ("[T]he United States sought to
limit the legal obligations in the Paris Agreement in part to avoid the need for ex post approval by the
Senate or Congress as a whole."); Karoun Demirjian & Steven Mufson, Trick or Treaty? The Legal
Question Hanging over the Paris Climate Change Conference, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/11/30/trick-or-treaty-the-legal-
question-hanging-over-the-paris-climate-change-conference [http://perma.cc/2D2M-3SZB].
229. Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the Obama Administration to the Practice
and Theory ofInternational Law, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 455,464 (2016) ("President Obama knew from the
outset that two-thirds of the Senators would not consent to . . . the Paris Agreement.").
230. United States Joins, supra note 224, at 381. But see Koh, supra note 227 (arguing
that the tripartite legal framework for U.S. international agreements-treaty, congressional-executive
agreement, and executive agreement-should be de-emphasized for a more substantive, contextual
inquiry into the President's legal authority to enter into international agreements).
231. Koh, supra note 227, at 352.
232. Goldsmith, supra note 229, at 463.
233. Id. at 456. Obama's other key international agreement that fits this description is
the Iran Nuclear Deal.
234. Id. at 464.
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together various bases of executive authority-rulemaking power under the
Clean Air Act, existing U.S. treaty obligations, etc.-to construct an
international climate agreement that circumvented Congress. 235 As Professor
Goldsmith notes, the two prongs of this strategy are entirely normal when
employed separately. Presidents often unilaterally make international political
commitments and unilaterally exercise domestic policy authority. But in the
Paris Agreement, "[w]hat was innovative was bringing the two prongs together
in one initiative to forge deep international cooperation supported by significant
changes in U.S. domestic law without recourse to a congressional vote., 2 3 6
Through that alchemy of presidential administration, Obama constructed an
international climate policy that was unachievable through conventional means.
2. Trump: De-Decarbonization
Political commentator Jonathan Chait wrote as Trump took office, "if there
was a single aspect of Obama's legacy most vulnerable to reversal, it was his
achievements on climate change." 237 To examine that vulnerability, this Article
discusses Trump's approach to the CPP and then his relationship with the Paris
Agreement.
To reorient domestic climate policy, President Trump has employed three
key strategies: appointments, directive authority, and appropriations. The first
two strategies have been quite successful, while Congress initially rebuffed his
attempt to reorient climate-related appropriations (at least through one budget
cycle).
* To begin with appointments, Trump essentially ended Obama's regulatory
efforts to contain carbon emissions with one appointment: Scott Pruitt as EPA
Administrator. Scott Pruitt largely denies anthropogenic climate change and
fervently opposes Obama's climate policies. 2 3 8 So far, Pruitt has zealously
implemented Trump's deregulatory climate agenda and suppressed government
science on climate threats. 2 39
With that dutiful appointee in place, Trump sought to undo most of
Obama's major domestic climate policy through a single Executive Order.2 4 0 The
235. Id. at 466 ("The Obama team's imaginative answer to this conundrum was to
locate the authority to fulfill the political commitments in independent domestic law authorities that were
not designed to effectuate or approve international agreements.").
236. Id. at 467.
237. CHAIT, supra note 200, at 139.
238. Brady Dennis & Chris Mooney, On Climate Change, Scott Pruitt Causes an
Uproar-and Contradicts the EPA's Own Website, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/09/on-climate-change-scott-pruitt-
contradicts-the-epas-own-website [http://perma.cc/5J4R-W6G4].
239. See Coral Davenport, Counseled by Industry, Not Staff E.P.A. Chiefls Offto a
Blazing Start, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/politics/trump-epa-
chief-pruitt-regulations-climate-change.html [http://perma.cc/8262-VPPQ]; infra notes 329-330.
240. Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783,
82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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EO directed Administrator Pruitt to "as soon as practicable, suspend, revise, or
rescind" the CPP. 24 1 Within days, Pruitt announced his review of the CPP in
accordance with the EO.242 Meanwhile in the West Virginia litigation
challenging EPA's implementation of the CPP, the D.C. Circuit granted the
EPA's requested two-month suspension of the case.243 This was widely seen as
a prelude to the withdrawal of the EPA's rule, 24 4 and the EPA proposed repeal
of the CPP in October 2017.245 The DC Circuit had already heard oral argument
in the case, and a ruling seemed imminent. Pro-CPP litigants seem to be mulling
various legal strategies to force a ruling, block CPP rescission, or force some
type of EPA carbon plan,2 46 while the EPA and anti-CPP parties pursue the
opposite course. 24 7 Post-CPP litigation could thus indicate how successful (or
unsuccessful) pro-regulatory litigants can be in blocking rescissions and forcing
regulation by the Trump Administration. The administration has already been
stymied in its attempt to delay the effective date of an Obama-era regulation
without going through the necessary notice-and-comment process.248 For now,
Trump has combined his appointment and directive powers to successfully put
his deregulatory aims in motion.
However, Trump has not been entirely successful in his attempts to
depower environmental regulation. The Trump Administration attempted to
slash the EPA budget, reducing it to levels not seen in a quarter century. The
Administration's proposed cuts to the EPA were so severe that they would have
disabled the agency far into the future. 2 49 However, through one budget cycle,
241. Id. § 4.
242. Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017).
243. Order, State of West Virginia v. EPA, (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2017) (No. 15-01363),
http://www.edforg/sites/default/files/content/2017.04.28_ordergrantingabeyance-cpp.pdf [http://
perma.cc/4TKH-S9C2].
244. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Court Freezes Clean Power Plan Lawsuit,
Signaling Likely End to Obama's Signature Climate Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/28/court-freezes-clean-power-
plan-lawsuit-signaling-likely-end-to-obamas-signature-climate-policy [http://perma.cc/276W-M6SM].
245. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017).
246. E.g., Brianne Gorod, If Trump Wants To Abandon the Clean Power Plan, the
Courts Shouldn't Give Him Cover, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 8, 2017), http://
yalejreg.com/nc/if-trump-wants-to-abandon-the-clean-power-plan-the-courts-shouldnt-give-him-cover-
by-brianne-gorod [http://perma.cc/AUS4-BM5H].
247. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Fate of the Clean Power Plan Case: Hold in
Abeyance, or Remand?, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 5, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/
the-fate-of-the-clean-power-plan-case-hold-in-abeyance-or-remand-by-nicholas-r-parrillo [http://perma.
cc/EAV5-56UX].
248. See Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Lisa Friedman, Court
Blocks Effort To Suspend Obama-Era Methane Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/climate/court-blocks-epa-effort-to-suspend-obama-era-methane-
rule.html [http://perma.cc/UXR7-PWCK]; Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Reverses Course on Ozone Rule, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/climate/epa-reverses-course-on-ozone-
rule.html [http://perma.cc/9YR6-4AZQ].
249. See Devin Henry, Trump Takes Hatchet to EPA, HILL (Mar. 1, 2017), http://
thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/321684-trump-takes-hatchet-to-epa [http://perma.cc/952J-
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the GOP-controlled Congress largely ignored his demand for deep EPA cuts and
kept EPA funding close to flat.250 That congressional rebuke of Trump's EPA
budget was part of a broader pattern of general bipartisan disregard for major
aspects of what Professor Strauss terms Trump's "deconstructive" spending
plan. 251
On the international side, Trump was not quite as aggressive in immediately
unwinding Obama's signature accomplishment. In June 2017, Trump ultimately
decided to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.252 As Professor Goldsmith notes,
the Paris Agreement was "fragilfe]," since "[p]olitical commitments that skirt
Congress can be reversed by a subsequent president." 2 5 3 Indeed, Trump could
have given notice of withdrawal the moment he was sworn in. Instead, his
Administration was seemingly divided over whether to leave the Agreement. 25 4
As Professor Koh notes, under the Agreement's terms, Trump "could not
formally withdraw the United States from its Paris obligations until the start of
the next four-year presidential term." 255 That required timeframe, from an
agreement that is mostly non-binding, made withdrawal less attractive. If
Trump's domestic deregulatory efforts on climate change are successful, the
domestic and international political ramifications of withdrawal might not be
worth it. Indeed, Trump seemingly faced more immediate political blowback for
withdrawing from Paris, both at home and abroad, than he did for starting to
unwind the domestic policies that operationalized the agreement. 2 56
N4NZ] (quoting Democratic Rep. Raul Grijalva saying, "If this budget is enacted the way he [Trump]
wants it, he's effectively dealt a very significant death blow to the EPA.").
250. How Science Fares in the US. Budget Deal, SCI. MAG. (May 1, 2017, 11:15 AM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/how-science-fares-us-budget-deal [http://perma.cc/99BJ-
A9DQ].
251. Strauss, supra note 129, at 13; see Carl Hulse, Why Congress's Bipartisan Budget
Deal Should Make Trump Worried, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/
politics/congress-budget-deal-democrats-republicans.html [http://perma.cc/KC55-GDM]; Robert Pear,
Congress Rejects Trump Proposals To Cut Health Research Funds, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/1 1/us/politics/national-institutes-of-health-budget-trump.htnl
[http://perma.cc/N4TS-TZEF].
252. Camila Domonoske & Colin Dwyer, Trump Announces US. Withdrawal From
Paris Climate Accord, NPR (June 1, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/01/
530748899/watch-live-trump-announces-decision-on-paris-climate-agreement [http://perma.cc/2NMA-
9YHQ].
253. Goldsmith, supra note 229, at 471.
254. Evan Halper, Republicans Are Rethinking Their Disdain for the Paris Accord-
Creating a Political Headache for Trump, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
politics/la-na-pol-trump-paris-20170427-story.html [http://perma.cc/D5J6-TSN9]; Chris Mooney &
Brady Dennis, Scott Pruitt Calls for an 'Exit'from the Paris accord, Sharpening the Trump White House's
Climate Rift, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/
wp/2017/04/14/trumps-epa-chief-scott-pruitt-calls-for-an-exit-to-the-paris-climate-agreement [http://
perma.cc/M2GZ-B738]. The Administration's ultimate decision seems to rest on how it interprets its
ability to lower U.S. carbon reduction commitments under the Agreement. John Schwartz, Debate over
Paris Climate Deal Could Turn on a Single Phrase, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/02/climate/trump-paris-climate-accord.html [http://perma.cc/RSH5-JYV3].
255. Koh, supra note 227, at 357.
256. See, e.g., Scot Clement & Brady Dennis, Post-ABC Poll: Nearly 6 in 10 Oppose
Trump Scrapping Paris Agreement, WASH. POST (June 5, 2017) (showing broad disagreement with
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3. Climate Policy Prospects
Our look at climate policy highlights both the power and perils of
presidentialism. Bold action is possible, but it may not be durable. And Congress
still holds the purse strings. First, durability: the Obama CPP was a bold move
internationally and domestically, but it was also particularly fragile in the face
of presidentialist reversal. The major Obama climate actions are on their way to
elimination. Post-CPP repeal litigation will largely determine the extent to which
pro-regulatory litigants can use courts to at least delay Trump's deregulatory
efforts. Whether EPA can produce a reasoned case for rescission of its regulation
remains to be seen. But even if the regulation were to remain in place,
enforcement is unlikely. Attempts to force regulatory or enforcement action
through litigation are almost certain losers. 2 57 On the other hand, history may be
on the side of the CPP. Emissions reduction could continue into the future
because of market and technological trends that began during and arguably, in
part, due to the Obama Administration, even as Trump rolls back climate
regulation. 258
The rescission of domestic climate policy contrasts sharply with the
temporary stickiness of the Paris Agreement. Even though the Trump
Administration ultimately announced its intention to withdraw, it proved
politically more difficult to abrogate the Paris Agreement than to stymie
Obama's domestic initiatives. The Paris Agreement, like DACA in the
immigration context, is harder to undo because of the political costs. But, as with
DACA, initial durability was more a function of politics than formal legal
constraints on presidential administration. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
demands no administrative process and is not subject to judicial review.
The Paris Agreement thus illustrates the high policy risk, in general, of
presidential administration as applied to international law. Because Obama
operationalized the United States' compliance with the Paris Agreement through
domestic regulatory authority that is formally unrelated to the Agreement, the
litigation over the CPP threatened to cause a breach of U.S. commitments under
the Agreement. When the President stretches domestic power to unilaterally
decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/06/05/post-abc-poll-nearly-6-in-10-oppose-trump-scrapping-paris-agreement
[http://perma.cc/R66U-XGFR]. While it is hard to compare public sentiment on these two points
empirically, our sense is that the Paris Agreement withdrawal was the more acutely negative event, in
terms of public reaction.
257. Indeed, we have seen Administrator Pruitt pull back EPA enforcement in other
areas. E.g., Pruitt Moves To Curb E.P.A.'s Power To Demand Pollution Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/09/us/politics/document-EPA-Clean-Air-Act-and-Its-
Power-to-Request.html [http://perma.cc/72CQ-M8MF].
258. See, e.g., CHAIT, supra note 200, at 140 ("In some ways, the work of the green
energy revolution has already changed the economic calculus irreversibly. By the end of 2016, American
power plants had already met their 2024 emissions reduction targets . . . "); Koh, supra note 227, at 361
("The shift in investment patterns toward renewable energy may have reached a point where it is very
hard to reverse.").
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make international agreements, he "has no guarantee that domestic law will
permit the United States to fulfill the pledges made in the [international] political
, ,259commitments. Professor Goldsmith views such judicial and legislative
constraints on domestic regulatory efforts to fulfill international agreements as
an accountability mechanism on the President, but that accountability also makes
these agreements operationally precarious.26 0
Second, Trump's initial experience with EPA appropriations challenges the
Levinson-Pildes "separation of parties" thesis. The unified GOP Congress
mostly maintained EPA funding even as the Trump Administration wanted to
dramatically curtail it. One imagines that certain Republican congressmen-
even if they were aligned with many aspects of the Trump climate agenda-had
EPA offices or projects in their home states and districts that would not have
survived the cuts. At least some separation of powers checks are maintained in
this unified government.
But climate policy also teaches a contrary lesson. Here again is a major
policy area where Congress has essentially ceded all meaningful policymaking
to the executive branch. The executive has become more and more capable of
action as the legislature has become less and less so. That, only eight or nine
years ago Congress seemed poised to pass major climate legislation is rather
remarkable, given how unlikely any such action would be now. As with
immigration, presidential administration has grown with gridlock. From that
perspective, the separation of powers motivates presidentialism rather than
constraining it.
C. The Construction (and Deconstruction) of the Administrative State
Aside from certain landmark legislation during the first two years of his
presidency when Democrats controlled Congress, 261 Obama's primary
achievements were regulatory. Aside from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 262 the
early Trump presidency's domestic achievements have been, likewise, almost
entirely deregulatory. Central to both administrations' success was how they
ordered and re-ordered the administrative state in furtherance of their actions.
1. Obama's Construction
This Part focuses attention on three aspects of Obama's ordering of the
administrative state: (i) his modest restructuring of the OIRA review process for
259. Goldsmith, supra note 229, at 465-66; see id. at 471 ("In other words, the core of
the President's pledge in Paris is subject to judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act.").
260. Id. at 471.
261. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2018)).
262. Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
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rulemaking, along with other policy changes he made to influence the cost-
benefit balancing at the analytical heart of the OIRA process, (ii) his use of White
House policy "czars" to coordinate administrative action, and (iii) his
Administration's aggressive, adjudication-oriented enforcement initiatives to
promote consumer protection and corporate responsibility.
In Kagan's presidentialist narrative, a key feature of presidential
administration for both Reagan and Clinton was how each, through Executive
Orders, constructed regulatory review at OIRA.2 63 This institutionalization of
presidentialism has proved relatively durable. For Obama, notwithstanding the
bold rulemakings that defined his presidency, his formal changes to the OIRA
process were fairly minor. At the beginning of his presidency, his initial OIRA
Executive Order merely rolled back two of Bush II's EOs that altered the OIRA
process from what Clinton had created.264 But those Bush II EOs had themselves
made fairly minor changes to the Clinton process. 2 6 5 Thus, Obama merely
reestablished the Clinton process, which had remained much the same through
Bush II's tenure.
Later in his first term, Obama signed another Executive Order on regulatory
process, but this second EO, by its own terms, was "supplemental to and
reaffirm[ed] the principles ... that were established in [Clinton's] Executive
Order 12866."266 Although Obama's second foray into regulatory review was
notable for its recognition of the importance of considering non-monetizable
values in agency regulatory analyses, 267 this second EO brought nothing like the
process sea changes of Reagan and Clinton.268 This administrative
conservativism perhaps embodied an early streak of regulatory skepticism in
263. See supra Part II.
264. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,113 (Feb. 4, 2009). Moreover, OMB
effectively retained certain Bush II changes that EO 13,497 had seemingly revoked. See Memorandum
from Peter R. Orzag, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and
Agencies (Mar. 4,2009), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda
fy2009/m09-13.pdf [http://perma.cc/JL98-JR55].
265. See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 2, 2002), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2002-02-28/pdf/02-5069.pdf [http://perma.cc/J85W-N7ZL] (making fairly
minor changes to certain lines ofauthority in review process); Exec. OrderNo. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763
(Jan. 23, 2007); see also Roger G. Noll, The Economic Signicance ofExecutive Order 13,422, 25 YALE
J. ON REG. 113, 123 (2008) ("Executive Order 13,422 is not very important in the grand scheme of
regulatory policy.").
266. Exec. OrderNo. 13,563,76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 § 1(b) (Jan. 21, 2011). Another
Obama Executive Order recommended (but did not require) that independent agencies comply with
Executive Order 13,563. Exec. Order No. 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July. 14, 2011).
267. See Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis,
123 YALE L.J. 1732, 1736 (2014) (discussing the Executive Order's explicit inclusion of non-monetizable
dignity as a factor that agencies can consider in cost-benefit analyses).
268. But see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs: Myths
and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1838, 1846 (2013) (calling Executive Order 13,563 "a document of
signal importance in the Obama Administration, indeed a kind of mini-constitution for the regulatory
state").
589
Yale Journal on Regulation
President Obama269 -a skepticism that seemingly gave way as regulatory
initiatives came to define the latter three-quarters of his presidency. Or perhaps
the durability of the OIRA review process is better understood as another
example of Shane's "one-way ratchet." Whatever the precise criteria for
acceptable regulatory impact analyses, that they are required institutionalizes
EOP control over major administrative policy making.
The Obama years thus cemented the core, OIRA-supervised, rulemaking
process as the "new normal" in American administrative governance, 2 70 to the
chagrin of some on the left.2 7 1 The Obama Administration's trans-substantive,
pro-regulatory changes to the rulemaking environment came elsewhere. The
Obama initiatives shifted the cost-benefit calculus within the EO 12,866
framework, rather than altering the framework itself. A crucial move was the
formation of an inter-agency working group to estimate the social cost of carbon
emissions-a cost that the working group subsequently revised upward.272 This
carbon cost estimate (as well as quantified costs for other greenhouse gases)
shifted cost-benefit calculations across multiple agency rulemaking processes.2 73
The higher the quantified cost of carbon pollution, the more regulation to combat
carbon emissions became justified. The Obama Administration also insinuated
climate-conscious reasoning into administrative processes in numerous other
ways. 274 Similarly, various agencies increased, often dramatically, the value
269. Binyamin Applebaum & Michael D. Shear, The Obama Era, Part 1: The
Regulator in Chief N.Y. TIMES (Aug 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/us/politics/obama-
era-legacy-regulation.html [http://perma.cc/SV33-CNJA] (arguing that Obama "entered office ...
determined to make his mark by passing bold new laws, not by tinkering with rules" and that "[t]he new
president had a skeptical streak when it came to the value of regulation, influenced by ... Cass R.
Sunstein, a Harvard Law professor who had long argued that the government should more rigorously
assess the benefits of new regulations. Mr. Obama liked that idea so much that he named Mr. Sunstein to
lead" OIRA).
270. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Obama's Cost-Benefit Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan.
22, 2011), http://newrepublic.com/article/81990/obama-cost-benefit-revolution [http://perma.cc/M6HZ-
W8YC] (finding, contrary to the article's title, non-revolutionary continuity between Obama's approach
and those of Reagan and Clinton).
271. See, e.g.,Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on "Retaking
Rationality Two Years Later," 48 Hous. L. REv. 43 (2011); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 335 (2011); Richard Lacayo,
Why Obama 's Regulatory Czar Makes Liberals Nervous, TIME (Feb. 24,2009), http://content.time.com/time/politics/
article/0,8599,1881473,00.html [http://penna.cc/A7LH-WDS6].
272. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON Soc. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL UPDATE
OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866
(May 2013, Rev. July 2015), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/scc-
tsd-final-july-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/8UX9-2ECL].
273. See JANE A. LEGGETT, CONG. RES. SERV., R44657, FEDERAL CITATIONS TO THE
SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=799816
[http://perma.cc/M55V-7T3G]; Applebaum & Shear, supra note 269 ("Quantifying. . .damage. . . from
carbon emissions, would broaden the assessed benefits of new regulations-potentially justifying new
and stronger restrictions.").
274. See Hoshijima, supra note 201.
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assigned to a saved life for cost-benefit purposes.27 5 This higher quantified
benefit was, again, pro-regulatory.27 6
Elsewhere, the Bush 11 Administration had engaged in information
practices concerning scientific matters, particularly as related to climate change
that can be described as information suppression.277 The Obama Administration
reversed course. It made a strong push for transparency and political non-
intervention in public study and dissemination of conclusions about science and
technology. 278 While not inherently pro-regulatory, information transparency
tended to counter the Bush II political interventions in government science that
were anti-regulatory. Scientific integrity and transparency is undoubtedly a
positive development in itself, but it also worked to further Obama's regulatory
agenda of shifting the balance of costs and benefits in a pro-regulatory
direction.279
275. Binyamin Applebaum, As US. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses
Fret, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/
17regulation.html [http://perma.cc/9YAD-33XW].
276. Not all Obama-era calculative cost-benefit changes were pro-regulatory. Congress
passed legislation that provided the FDA with certain regulatory authority over tobacco. Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified at 21
U.S.C. §§ 387-87t). But in 2014, a cost-benefit analysis that the FDA's economists prepared cast doubt
on the agency's major rulemaking efforts pursuant to that new authority. Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis, Deeming Tobacco Products To Be Subject to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Apr. 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D-FDA-2014-N-0189-20877 [http:/
perma.cc/G55Z-KVJ7]; Micah Berman, Cost-Benefit Analysis, the FDA, and Tobacco, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 16, 2014), http://yalejreg.com/nc/cost-benefit-analysis-the-fda-and-tobacco-
by-micah-berman [http://perma.cc/87BM-MK2P]. Because the FDA economists insisted that the agency
consider the loss of enjoyment from smoking that its rule would impose on smokers as a part of the costs
of the rule, the welfare gain was relatively modest when those costs were compared with the rule's
anticipated health benefits. Sharon Begley, FDA Calculates Costs ofLost Enjoyment IfE-Cigarette Rules
Prevent Smoking, REUTERS (June 2, 2014); Sabrina Tavemise, In New Calculus on Smoking, It's Health
Gained vs. Pleasure Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/health
/pleasure-factor-may-override-new-tobacco-rules.html [http://perma.cc/TM8B-QBDL]. According to
press reports, this analysis made the rulemaking proposal harder to defend. Celia Wexler, How Much Is
the 'Lost Pleasure' from a Cigarette Worth?, LIVESCIENCE (June 24, 2014, 5:15 PM), http://
www.livescience.com/46503-value-of-lost-pleasure-from-smoking.html [http://perma.cc/C2PR-QGHF].
277. SHANE, supra note 48, at 167.
278. Scientific Integrity: Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 74
Fed. Reg. 10,671, 10,671 (Mar. 9, 2009) ("Political officials should not suppress or alter scientific or
technological findings and conclusions. If scientific and technological information is developed and used
by the Federal Government, it should ordinarily be made available to the public. To the extent permitted
by law, there should be transparency in the preparation, identification, and use of scientific and
technological information in policymaking. The selection of scientists and technology professionals for
positions in the executive branch should be based on their scientific and technological knowledge,
credentials, experience, and integrity."); Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President
for Sci. & Tech., Sci. Integrity, to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Dec. 17, 2010), http://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-
12172010.pdf [http://perma.cc/FZU8-MPKB] (elaborating on the presidential directive).
279. The Obama Administration still faced accusations of meddling in science when it
suited political goals. One controversy concerned the prescription status of "Plan B" contraception pills.
See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 170-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Thus, three distinguished
scientists, including the Editor-in-Chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, wrote: 'In our opinion,
the [HHS] Secretary's decision to retain behind-the-counter status for Plan B One-Step was based on
politics rather than science."' (quoting The Politics ofEmergency Contraception, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED.
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Moving from process to personnel, a noted feature of the Obama
Administration was its heavy reliance on so-called "czars," 280 presidential
advisors, generally (functionally if not formally) located within the EOP who
often exercised immense authority (if de facto rather than de jure) over
presidential administration in a given policy domain. Policy czars (and similar
centralizing mechanisms) are not new. President Clinton created the National
Economic Council, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy and
Council on Environmental Quality have existed since the 1970s as mechanisms
to centralize policymaking in the White House.
However, Obama used policy czars "far more pervasively than any
previous administration." 281 In assessing the tools for presidential supervision,
these policy czars are sometimes treated as equivalent to OIRA review in
operationalizing presidential directive authority through a restructured
administrative state.282 And these "czars," although presumably in charge of
major policy areas, are not department heads requiring Senate confirmation of
their appointments.
To take one example from the beginning of Obama's tenure, when Obama
needed a point-person to address the floundering U.S. auto industry, he did not
rely on the Department of Transportation or its Secretary. Instead, he appointed
financier Steven Rattner as his "car czar." As the U.S. auto industry teetered on
the brink of collapse in early 2009, Rattner managed the U.S. government's
investment of nearly eighty billion dollars (USD) into the automotive sector,
chiefly through investments in GM and Chrysler.
2 8 3
101, 102 (2012))); Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA's Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 102
GEO. L.J. 927 (2014); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV.
683, 706-16 (2016) (describing how Plan B saga demonstrated "interfering with science"); Heidi
Kitrosser, Scientific Integrity: The Perils and Promise of White House Administration, 79 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 2395 (2011) (discussing "the Obama Administration's relationship to scientific information").
280. For an informal listing of Obama's czars through the first six years of his
Administration, see Arit John, The Encyclopedia of All 34 of Obama's Czars, From A to Zients,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-10-25/the-encyclopedia-
of-all-34-of-obamas-czars-from-a-to-zients [http://perma.cc/BQR4-EQW7].
281. Aaron J. Saiger, Obama's "Czars"for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White
House Staff 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2577, 2578 (2011); see also Watts, supra note 279, at 704 ("Although
czars have 'solid roots in earlier administrations,' Obama has used regulatory czars more heavily than
other Presidents." (internal citations omitted)); Kevin Sholette, Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (2010).
282. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1857 (2015).
283. For an enlightening economic account of the auto bailout, see Austan D. Goolsbee
& Alan B. Krueger, A Retrospective Look at Rescuing and Restructuring General Motors and Chrysler
28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21000, 2015), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w21000 [http://perma.cc/4J5L-VP5P]. For a skeptical perspective on Rattner's work as car czar,
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On Rattner's telling, the decision to bail out Chrysler, at least to a certain
degree, essentially was his to make.284 Congress "had already appropriated funds
for the auto bailout during the end of the Bush administration," but Rattner's
team decided how the bailout money would be spent.285 Among other myriad,
sector-defining decisions, Rattner led negotiations with lenders over multi-
billion debt restructurings for Chrysler and GM, and he personally, "on behalf
of' the President, "demanded that GM's chief executive at the time ... step
down." 286 According to Rattner, his broad authority-his nearly unilateral
executive power-was necessary. He argues if congressional approval had been
necessary for these decisions, "at least one" of the major U.S. automakers would
have "collapsed."2 87
To take another example from the later Obama years, the President
appointed Ron Klain as his "Ebola czar" in 2014. The Klain appointment-
which was, for the most part, forgotten soon after it happened, as U.S. fears over
the disease abated2 8 8 -iS mainly interesting for the political purpose it served.
Obama appointed a "czar" to show decisive presidential leadership, as a means
to quell American panic over the disease's potential spread into the US. The
appointment came as Congress pummeled agency leaders for missteps in the
domestic response. 2 89 The czar appointment thus was a way to respond to
congressional criticism and mollify an anxious country. Indeed, in the modern
presidency, "presidential appointment of czars during the aftermath of a crisis
has become increasingly commonplace." 290 Obama was presumed to be directly
responsible for (and in control of) the government's response, and the Ebola czar
was his reaction to that political expectation. Once again, we observe Shane's
one-way ratchet. The more presidents take control, the more the public expects
them to exercise it-whatever the formal statutory allocation of authority.
284. Inside Obama's Auto Industry 'Overhaul,' NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Sept.
20, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/09/20/129993024/inside-obama-s-auto-industry-overhaul [http://
perma.cc/5UYH-LGL5] [hereinafter Obama Overhaul].
285. Id.
286. Neil King, Jr., Auto Czar Quits Post Six Months into the Job, WALL ST. J. (July
14, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 124751573500734529 [http://perma.cc/84QE-VVCD].
287. Obama Overhaul, supra note 284.
288. Russell Berman, A Quiet Exit for a Forgotten Ebola Czar, ATLANTIC (Dec. 8,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/ebola-czar-ron-klain-to-depart/383554/
[http://perma.cc/5UUF-7F2Y]; Marin Cogan, The Brief-But Busy-Reign ofthe Ebola Czar, N.Y. MAG.:
DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 1, 2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/ron-klain-on-his-
tenure-as-americas-ebola-czar.html [http://perma.cc/4WM8-YLGS] ("You may have temporarily
forgotten Klain.").
289. Juliet Eilperin & David Nakamura, Obama Taps Ron Klain as Ebola Czar, WASH.
POST (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/10/17/obama-taps-
ron-klain-as-ebola-czar [http://perma.cc/MQX5-7GJS]; Jack Healy et al., Obama May Name 'Czar' To
Oversee Ebola Response, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/us/obama-
may-name-ebola-czar-after-amber-joy-vinson-flight-causes-concern.html [http://perma.cc/3DJD-T78K].
290. Anna Spain Bradley, Cognitive Competence in Executive-Branch Decision
Making, 49 CONN. L. REv. 713, 728 (2017).
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This "proliferation of high-profile czars" obviously is another means for
expanding presidentialism. 2 91 When policy authority is pulled from agencies into
the EOP, the President does not even need to bother with directives, since the
policy chief is his own employee. Acting outside traditional agency structures, a
czar can also serve a coordinating function across the bureaucracy, which is
perhaps the best practical justification for the role.2 92 As Professor Aaron Saiger
puts it, a czar provides "an attractive synthesis of the technocratic advantages
traditionally associated with the agency form and the political responsiveness
ordinarily attributed to the White House staff." 2 93 But the czar role can also
inhibit accountability mechanisms that would exist at the agency level, like
congressional oversight and public information access. 2 94 For that reason
(admittedly as refracted through partisanship), Obama's czars precipitated a
minor separation-of-powers flare-up, when Congress attempted to use its
budgetary power to defund certain czar positions in the EOP. Although the
positions were already defunct, President Obama felt it necessary to push back
in a signing statement that argued the failure to fund these positions interfered
with the President's constitutional responsibility to assure faithful execution of
the laws (and therefore violated the separation of powers).29 5
A third theme concerning structural approaches to the administrative state
was the Obama Administration's relatively aggressive adjudicatory enforcement
initiatives to promote consumer protection and corporate responsibility.296
Although these adjudicatory efforts involved the creation of no new offices or
significant changes in process, we treat them as "structural" for two reasons.
First, much of the literature on presidential administration and presidential power
emphasizes presidential policymaking through legislative rules or Executive
Orders having a similar effect. The use of enforcement discretion as a regulatory
or deregulatory device has not had similar attention, although it is surely equally
291. Saiger, supra note 281, at 2583 ("President Obama's proliferation of high-profile
czars is his particular instantiation of a policy, common to all modem Presidents, of seeking to magnify
his control over agency action in domestic policy."); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization,
and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1751-52 (2015) ("White House 'czars' have emerged as a
means by which the White House can coordinate and control policy in areas of key concern to the
President.").
292. See Watts, supra note 279, at 704-05.
293. Saiger, supra note 281, at 2583.
294. Id. at 2594 ("[Clzars are free of the burden of justifying their own actions to
congressional committees. Their budgets come through the Executive Office of the President; they need
not justify themselves to the Senate at confirmation; they partake of executive privilege, to the extent that
it is available; and they are generally immune, as discussed below, to administrative discovery through
the Freedom of Information Act.").
295. Saiger, supra note 281, at 2578-79, 2603-04. As Saiger points out, this was a
breathtakingly broad claim-tantamount to saying Congress was required to fund the EOP at whatever
level the President requested.
296. In the broader scheme of federal law enforcement, one could also consider the
Obama Administration's attempts to curb the reach of federal drug laws, through the use of sentencing
discretion, commutations, and effective non-intervention in state drug legalization efforts (even when that
state-level legalization conflicted with federal law).
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important. The DACA and DAPA policies previously discussed concern
enforcement actions that would be carried out through individual adjudications.
The same is true of Trump's counter-moves to ramp up deportation. While
rulemaking is a more high-visibility approach to presidential policy direction,
the management of enforcement priorities may be a more powerful tool for
presidential administration.
With relative ease given the general non-reviewability of prosecutorial
discretion, the Obama Administration pushed the more muscular use of
adjudication and regulatory enforcement actions across agencies to further
policy goals of consumer and environmental protection, financial regulation, and
corporate responsibility-what we will call, for economy of phrasing more than
anything else, "white-collar enforcement." A common left-wing complaint
against the Obama Administration was its softness on white-collar crime,
particularly in terms of criminal prosecutions against large financial
institutions. 2 97 This Article takes no position on whether that critique is or is not
valid in an absolute sense, but at least relative to prior practice, white-collar
enforcement was notably more muscular under Obama.
The Obama years brought a parade of multi-billion dollar settlements
related to corporate and financial crime. Corporate settlements of this size
certainly existed before Obama, but the number and prosecutorial intensity of
these cases were much greater.2 98 Record-size settlements for various legal
violations felt like the new normal. To recount some highlights, Volkswagen
paid nearly fifteen billion dollars (USD) to settle charges related its emissions
scandal (with regulators still apparently considering criminal charges against
individual executives); 29 9 BP paid over twenty-three billion in civil and criminal
penalties (along with guilty pleas to criminal charges) for the Gulf oil spill;300
five large U.S. banks paid twenty-five billion dollars for shoddy foreclosure
297. E.g., Rigged Justice: How Weak Enforcement Lets Corporate Offenders Off Easy,
OFF. SEN. ELIZABETH WARREN (2016), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/RiggedJustice
2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/W8MM-XCS2]. This criticism came to a head when then-Attomey General
Eric Holder remarked in congressional testimony that certain financial firms are too large and systemically
important to criminally prosecute. See Danielle Douglas, Holder Concerned Megabanks Too Big To Jail,
WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/holder-concemed-
megabanks-too-big-to-jail/2013/03/06/6fa2bO7a-869e-11e2-999e-5f8e0410cb9dstory.html
[http://perma.cc/F3PF-BTY6].
298. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise ofBank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J. F. 33, 36
fig.1 (2016).
299. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Law of the Test: Performance-Based
Regulation and DieselEmissions Control, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 33, 35 (2017) (describing the settlement
and other potential corporate and individual legal liability).
300. Tom Fowler, BP Slapped with Record Fine, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324556304578120140555122104 [http://
perma.cc/UR34-EM69); Daniel Gilbert & Sarah Kent, BP Agrees To Pay $18.7 Billion to Settle
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims, WALL ST. J. (July 2,2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-agrees-
to-pay-1 8-7-billion-to-settle-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-claims- 1435842739 [http://perma.cc/8PEQ-
W4CV].
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practices; 30 1 JP Morgan separately settled charges related to mortgage-backed
securities for thirteen billion;3 0 2 and HSBC paid nearly two billion for money
laundering violations.303 The list could go on. Not included in the above
examples are Obama-era prosecutions under America's chief federal anti-bribery
law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), which Obama-era prosecutors
commonly used as a tool in white-collar enforcement. While FCPA enforcement
was increasing prior to the Obama Administration, the Obama years saw
sustained enforcement efforts under the FCPA.304
Notwithstanding those massive settlements, the Obama Administration was
dogged by claims about its allegedly kid-gloves approach to white-collar
enforcement. Seemingly in response to this complaint, the Obama-era DOJ also
oriented itself more toward individual criminal charges in white-collar cases.305
In what has come to be known as the "Yates Memo"-a guidance document
from the same Deputy Attorney General who Trump subsequently fired when
she declined to defend his travel ban as Acting Attorney General-the Justice
Department implemented policy changes to enforcement discretion and intemal
prosecutorial processes to promote individual criminal charges in white-collar
cases. 3 06 Like DACA and DAPA, the Yates Memo is an immediately reversible
ordering of enforcement discretion.
On a more consumer-oriented level, the Obama Administration leveraged
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which was created through
301. Nick Timiraos et al., U.S., Banks Agree on Foreclosure Pact, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000 1424052970203315804577211620066795962 [http://
perma.cc/NHS2-3VS2].
302. Devlin Barrett & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan, U.S. Settle for $13 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/jp-morgan-us-settle-for- 13-billion- 1384890222
[http://perma.cc/ER3Z-Q7MK].
303. Devlin Barrett & Evan Perez, HSBC to Pay Record U.S. Penalty, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0001424127887324478304578 1716 508874675 68
[http://perma.cc/6JR5-RPPX]. For a partial list that includes other major Obama-era corporate
settlements, see David Benoit and Stephen Grocer, Where JP. Morgan's Settlement Sits in History of
Corporate Fines, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/10/19/where-j-p-
morgans-settlement-sits-in-history-of-corporate-fines [http://perma.cclEA6T-YSQ6].
304. Nine of the ten biggest FCPA enforcement actions were settled during the Obama
Administration. Richard L. Cassin, Reconsidered: Odebrecht and Braskem Are on our FCPA Top Ten
List, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 29, 2016, 8:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/12/29/reconsidered-
odebrecht-and-braskem-are-on-our-fcpa-top-ten-.html [http://perma.cc/UF7C-MQXT]. For a critique of
this FCPA enforcement, see Michael B. Mukasey & James C. Dunlop, Can Someone Please Turn on the
Lights? Bringing Transparency to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y
PRAC. GROUPS, at 30 (2012), http://www.fed-soc.org/library/doclib/20120405
MukaseyDunlopEngagel3.1.pdf [http://perma.cc/BS5A-3PH2].
305. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics/new-justice-
dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html[http://perma.cc/DX6T-XF72].
306. Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., on Individual
Responsibility for Corp. Wrongdoing. (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036
/download [http://perma.cc/BPN6-6V72]; Garrett, supra note 298, at 45. For a good, brief summary of
the memo, see Ted Banks & James Lord, Compliance Programs, Individual Liability, and the Yates
Memo: Has Anything Changed?, BUS. L. TODAY, at 1, 1 (June 2016).
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the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill,307 with authority over a range of consumer
protection issues. In just over five years of operation under the Obama
Administration, the CFPB handled one million individual consumer complaints
about various financial products.0 Through various enforcement actions and
investigations, it "has returned approximately $12 billion in monetary relief to
approximately twenty-seven million consumers over the agency's first five
years, including both monetary compensation and principal reductions, cancelled
debts, and similar forms of relief," along with another five hundred million
dollars in civil penalties. 30 9 The CFPB's strong, consumer-level action is central
to Obama's white-collar enforcement legacy. But its enforcement posture is
unlikely to persist under the Trump Administration. Republicans have
consistently derided the CFPB.3 10 That has left the agency intact, but created the
distinct possibility, which is seemingly being realized now, that a Trump-
appointed agency head would take a decidedly less aggressive regulatory
posture.
2. Trump's Deconstruction
Early in President Obama's tenure, he delivered a "curt message" to the
House Republican majority leader Eric Cantor: "Elections have
consequences." 311 One imagines that those words have been echoing in the
former president's mind as he watches President Trump seek to eliminate much
of his legacy. Indeed, as former presidential advisor Steve Bannon put it-
admittedly at a time when his influence with Trump seemed much greater than
now-Trump is aiming for the "deconstruction of the administrative state. 3 12
307. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, tit. X, 124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2113 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491-5603 (2012)); Kelly
Thompson Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 55, 55-56
(2017).
308. Cochran, supra note 307, at 66.
309. Id. at 59.
310. Jim Puzzanghera, Obama 's Consumer Protection Legacy Defined by Aggressive
Agency, L.A. TIMES (May 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-obama-consumer-protection-
20160529-snap-story.html [http://perma.cc/N5GT-TFZG].
311. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, How the Presidency Changed Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
17, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/17/us/politics/obama-legacy-changed-man.html
[http://perma.cc/QG38-YANQ].
312. Philip Rucker, Bannon: Trump Administration Is in Unending Battle for
'Deconstruction of the Administrative State,' WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/02/23/bannon-trump-administration-is-in-
unending-battle-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state [http://perma.cc/3RD9-LFUB]. This
stated goal is probably not an apt description of what the Trump Administration has actually done. Most
of its actions are designed to roll back exercises of administrative power, but not to reduce the authority
of administrative institutions. Indeed, much of the Trump deregulatory agenda depends upon action by
administrative agencies that have statutory jurisdictions and authority that the President cannot directly
control or exercise.
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In measuring the success of that "deconstruction" to date,3 13 this Article
will look at four areas of administrative policy: (i) various deregulatory process
requirements that Trump has imposed by executive order, (ii) widespread agency
rescission of Obama-era policies not embodied in promulgated rules, (iii)
Congress' resolutions under the Congressional Review Act (the CRA) that have
rolled back numerous major, late-term Obama-era regulations, and (iv) Trump's
use of appointments and his (seemingly now-temporary) installation of
administration loyalists at various agencies to monitor political appointees'
compliance with administration priorities.
To take each area in turn, let us begin with Trump's executive interventions
in regulatory process. As noted above, President Obama did relatively little to
alter the Clinton-era cost-benefit framework around which OIRA review is
based. President Trump, thus far, has taken the opposite approach; he has
attempted to remake the OIRA process. His changes shift the process
dramatically into something far more anti-regulatory than the process Reagan
created.
Trump's most dramatic changes came in Executive Order 13,771.314 In the
Order, Trump required that two existing regulations be repealed for every newly
promulgated regulation, and that the costs of that new regulation be less than or
equal to the cost of those two repealed regulations (together, the "2-for-i
rule").315 On a more macro level, the EO authorized the OMB director to impose
an annual regulatory cost budget on each federal agency, which OIRA
Administrator Rao has begun to do. 3 16 Another Order-EO 13,777-instructs
agencies to create "Regulatory Reform Task Forces" to identify regulations that
should be repealed.317 These deregulatory Orders are in addition to more targeted
uses of presidential directive authority to roll back Obama-era regulations. 3 18
313. For a recent, in-depth discussion of "Anti-Administrativism," see Gillian E.
Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REv. 1 (2017).
314. Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Order No. 13,771,
82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017). We ignore here Trump's formation of agency-level regulatory task
forces, which Professor Strauss discusses. Strauss, supra note 129, at 17-18.
315. Exec. Order 13,1771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 at § 2.
316. Memorandum fromNeomi Rao, Admin., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget (Sept. 7,2017),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/FY%202018%2ORegulato
ry%20Cost%20Allowances.pdf [http://perma.cc/7WCW-ABMJ].
317. Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg.
12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017).
318. See, e.g., supra Section IV.B.2; Identifying and Reducing Tax Regulatory
Burdens, Exec. Order No. 13,789, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,317 (Apr. 26, 2017). For EO 13,789, deregulation in
tax is especially likely to be successful, given the virtual impossibility of attaining standing to challenge
a rescission in tax that is taxpayer-friendly. See Andy Grewal, Trump's Broad Powers To Revoke Tax
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The 2-for-i rule seeks to impose on top of cost-benefit analysis what has
been called "cost-cost analysis."31 9 In addition, as one commentator described
the effects of regulatory budgets, "Maximizing net benefits will have no place in
the new EO's regulatory budget model. By default, agencies will have a strong
incentive to pick the rule that is least costly to industry stakeholders--even if the
net benefits of a slightly more costly rule would be substantially greater-in
order to meet budget caps." 320 In other words, EO 13,771, if effective (and that
is an open legal question), completely changes the regulatory impact analysis
'paradigm for the administrative state.
The 2-for-i rule and the related regulatory budget may be legally
ineffective as a basis for deregulation. In repealing rules as in promulgating
them, 32 1 the APA requires that agencies give reasons for repeal that are
cognizable under the statute that authorized the rule.3 22 Absent such reasons, the
rule is considered arbitrary, and the 2-for-I aspect of the EO seems particularly
vulnerable in this context. 3 23 For any given authorizing statute, it is unlikely to
be a cognizable reason for repealing a rule that the repeal is required under an
executive order to make way for another, unrelated rule. 32 4 Moreover, where a
319. Amit Narang, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Cost Analysis, REG. REV. (Feb. 19,
2017), http://www.theregreview.org/2017/02/19/narang-stunning-triumph-cost-cost-analysis [http://
perma.cc/6G7C-34HQ]. Per OMB guidance on EO 13,711, cost-benefit analysis in accordance with EO
12,866 is still required, in addition to compliance with the Trump regulatory orders. M-17-21,




321. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n ofU.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29(1983).
322. Agencies can only cite types of reasons that they are permitted to consider under
the statute or statutes authorizing their action. See, e.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d
1231, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
323. At least one conservative commentator expressed reservation about it. Brian
Knight, Quick Reaction to President Trump's Regulation Reduction Executive Order, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 30, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/quick-reaction-to-president-trumps-
regulation-reduction-executive-order-by-brian-knight/ [http://perma.cc/S2KZ-FNZB] ("A regulatory
budget is a good idea, but the 2-for-I requirement seems superfluous."). For some supportive thoughts on
the framework from a conservative analyst who subsequently served in the Trump Administration, see
Marcus Peacock, Implementing a Two-for-One Regulatory Requirement in the U.S. (Geo. Wash. Univ.
Reg. Stud. Ctr. Working Paper, Dec. 7, 2016), http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/
regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Peacock Implementing-Two-For-One%2012-
2016_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q22K-CPEV]; see also Sam Batkins, It Is Premature To Label a
Regulatory Budget Unconstitutional, REG. REv. (June 26, 2017) (defending the two-for-one rule),
http://www.theregreview.org/2017/06/26/batkins-premature-regulatory-budget-unconstitutional [http://
perma.cc/9YR5-QREL].
324. See Peter Shane, The GOP's Radical Assault on Regulations Has Already Begun,
WASH. MONTHLY (Feb. 27, 2017), http://washingtonmonthly.com/2017/02/27/the-gops-radical-assault-
on-regulations-has-already-begun/ [http://perma.cc/96KF-KP9B] (arguing that, without legislation, "the
Trump executive order cannot legally be implemented .... When Congress directs an agency to issue
regulations to address a particular problem, the factors that legally count as 'relevant' include issues
Congress itself identifies for agency concern and any other factors logically relevant to implementing the
statute at hand . . . . What isn't legally relevant in evaluating a new proposed regulation is whether there
are two old ones available to trash. There is no regulatory statute authorizing any agency to take that into
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statute compels adoption of the repealed rule, the administrative law violation is
even more obvious, for the repeal itself-rather than just its reasoning-violates
a statute. An executive-imposed regulatory budget may be largely invalid for
similar reasons.325 In both instances, statutory imposition of these requirements
by Congress would not be legally problematic. But because these orders are at
cross-purposes with the statutes under which many agencies operate, their effects
may be limited. Only time will tell if the federal courts agree. As a political
matter, they may be more effective. Policy challenges to OMB by line agencies
are hazardous to a political appointee's continued membership in the
administration.
It is thus too early to judge the impact of President Trump's boldest
regulatory orders. The rescission process for promulgated rules is, in many areas
of the law, fraught enough with litigation risk that the lasting scope of Trump's
success will be determined in the months and years to come. It is fair to say,
putting aside these process changes, that the Trump Administration has been
quite successful in forms of regulatory control that do not require repeal of
promulgated rules.
In particular, Trump and his administrators have been immensely
successful in their repeal of specific pro-regulatory guidance not embodied in
formal rules (and so much more easily rescinded) and their control of
government information and messaging that could be inimical to Trump's
agenda.326 In terms of rescinding informal guidance, a full catalogue of examples
would be too large to provide here, but the Trump Administration has already
rescinded policies ranging from the Obama Administration's calculation for how
agencies consider the social cost of carbon327 to the Administration's
interpretation of civil rights laws to protect transgender rights.3 2 8 In terms of
information control, the best example is environmental science, where the Trump
Administration made early moves to clamp down on the scientific data and
conclusions coming out of the EPA and elsewhere. 3 29 The EPA took down a
account .... An agency explaining that its repeal of Rule A was necessary to secure OMB approval to
promulgate Rule B would be laughed out of court. . . .").
325. E. Donald Elliott, President Trump Establishes Regulatory Budgets by Executive
Order, INSIDE ENERGY & ENV'T (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.insideenergyandenvironment.com/2017/02/
president-trump-establishes-regulatory-budgets-by-executive-order [http://perma.cc/K6BK-93FM] ("[I]n
the past, establishing a regulatory budget has generally been thought to require legislation.").
326. Eg., Nadja Popovich & Tatiana Schlossberg, 23 EnvironmentalRules RolledBack
in Trump's First 100 Days, N.Y. TiMES (May 2, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/02/
climate/environmental-rules-reversed-trump-100-days.html [http://perma.cc/S3E2-XGNN].
327. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,095 § 5 (Mar. 31, 2017).
328. Dep't of Justice & Dep't of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter (Feb. 22, 2017),
http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/press-release/file/94 1551/download [http://perma.cc/YX82-YKK3]; see
Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Revokes 25 Legal Guidance Documents Dating to 1975, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
21, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/us/politics/justice-dept-guidance-documents.html [http://
perma.cc/XA3U-XDDN]
329. See Michael Biesecker & Seth Borenstein, EPA Science Under Scrutiny by Trump
Political Staff ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26, 2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
cl423276fb574b07953651a68a082db9 [http://perma.cc/8XYP-5WRQ]; Joel Clement, Opinion, I'm a
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climate website that provided scientific climate data that had been available and
used by climate researchers and others for twenty years. 33 0
While executive action has quickly shifted regulatory guidance and
information practices, those practices could just as quickly shift again if Trump
is denied a second term. But other deregulatory successes-accomplished within
an extremely short time period-are more durable due to legislation made
possible by unified government.331
Specifically, the Republican-controlled Congress has used the
Congressional Review Act (CRA) 3 3 2 to repeal numerous major rules passed
during the final months of the Obama Administration. The CRA permits
Congress to pass joint resolutions to disapprove of rules that administrative
agencies have recently promulgated.3 34 If the President approves (or Congress
overrides his veto), the rule is voided. The CRA has been around for about twenty
years, and before this year, Congress had only once successfully used it to void
a rule.335
The CRA is quiescent no more. Congress and President Trump collaborated
to use the CRA to quickly void major Obama-era rules on issues from internet
privacy to coal mining debris, as well as a rule to prevent the mentally disabled
from purchasing firearms. 33 6 Later, Congress used the CRA to void the CFPB's




330. Chris Mooney & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Website Removes Climate Science Site from
Public View After Two Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/energy-environment/wp/2017/04/28/epa-website-removes-climate-science-site-from-public-view-after-
two-decades/ [http://perma.cc/3Y8Z-UVCR]; see also Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, Scott Pruitt Is
Carrying Out His E.P.A. Agenda in Secret, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017) http://
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/1 1/us/politics/scott-pruitt-epa.html [http://perma.cc/Z34G-QHXD]
(describing Pruitt's practices at the EPA),
331. See Juliet Eilperin, Trump Undertakes Most Ambitious Regulatory Rollback Since
Reagan, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-undertakes-most-
ambitious-regulatory-rollback-since-reagan/2017/02/12/0337bf0-efb4-1 1e6-9662-
6eedfl627882_story.html [http://perma.cc/TY6J-6M99].
332. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-08 (2018).
333. For a tracker ofCRA resolutions, see CRA Tracker, GEO. WASH. REG. STUD. CTR.,
http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edulsites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/
CRA%20Tracker%2004-13-2017%2B.pdf [http://perma.cclPD5N-7ANQ].
334. See MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Nov. 17, 2016), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5WBJ-FSDV].
335. The Bush-era Congress nullified the Labor Department's ergonomics rule, which
was formulated under President Clinton. Ergonomics Rule Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7
(2001); see also Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,262 (Nov. 14, 2000) (providing the final text of
the rule, prior to congressional nullification). Indeed, its use was so infrequently successful that the CRA
served as a minor novelty item on the syllabi of American administrative law courses.
336. Kevin Freking, GOP Congress Rolls Back Rules on Hunting, Broadband Privacy,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 2, 2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/0d6cc7d8ca484a93a8d76b4571000771/
gop-congress-rolls-back-rules-hunting-broadband-privacy [http://perma.cc/UM7G-Q8T5].
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rule against mandatory arbitration,337 which showed a dynamic interplay
between an administrative agency intended to be more independent and
Congress' political control. These CRA resolutions were "a historic reversal of
government rules in record time." 338 As other GOP legislative efforts have
sputtered, these CRA repeals "arguably constitute the Trump Administration's
chief domestic policy accomplishment of its first 100 days." 33 9 Although it is
hard to tell, this CRA effort was seemingly effected through collaboration
between the President and Congress, 34 0 even if not all CRA resolutions were
ultimately successful. 34 1
Of course, the Trump Administration could, arguably, rescind these
promulgated rules itself, without congressional assistance, but CRA resolutions
are far more potent than executive rescission. Rescission of rules is generally a
lengthy, public and participatory process, subject to the same searching judicial
review as when rules are promulgated.34 2 By contrast, the CRA allows for
revocation based on a simple up-or-down vote (assuming the President accedes)
under expedited procedures that give the resolutions agenda priority and
eliminate Senate filibusters. A formal administrative rescission could take
months or years and require hundreds (if not thousands) of pages of factual
findings and agency justification. A CRA resolution requires no factual record
or stated rationale and can be just one sentence. 34 3 And, unlike executive
rescission, CRA resolutions are immune from judicial review. 34
337. Renae Merle & Tory Newmyer, Congressional Republicans Use Special
Manuever [sic] To Kill 'Arbitration Rule', WASH. POST (Oct. 25,2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/economy/once-again-congressional-republicans-find-it-easier-to-kill-policy-than-write-
it/2017/10/25/06eb764e-b997-1 1e7-be94-fabb0fle9fib story.html [http://perma.cc/M9HB-VW9Z].
338. Michael D. Shear, Trump Discards Obama Legacy, One Rule at a Time, N.Y.
TIMES (May 1, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/trump-overturning-
regulations.html [http://perma.cc/A52P-993J].
339. Stuart Shapiro, Will Congressional Review Act Repeals Change Agency
Behavior?, REG. REV. (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.theregreview.org/2017/04/03/shapiro-congressional-
review-act-agency-behavior [http://perma.cc/6GAA-TK5R].
340. Shear, supra note 338.
341. See Coral Davenport, In Win for Environmentalists, Senate Keeps an Obama-Era
Climate Change Rule, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/
regulations-methane-climate-change.html [http://perma.cc/UXR7-PWCK] (describing failed
Congressional Review Act resolution that attempted to void an Obama-era methane regulation, although
the regulation can still be rescinded by the Interior Department). However, even though this methane rule
survived the CRA, Trump's Interior Department has already moved to delay and likely ultimately
eliminate it. See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation;
Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430 (June 15, 2017), http://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-06-15/pdf/2017-12325.pdf [http://perma.cc/M478-NPDM].
342. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29(1983).
343. 5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2012).
344. Id. § 805 ("No determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall
be subject to judicial review."). To the extent litigants have attempted to assert claims under the CRA,
they have claimed that existing agency rules are invalid because they were not properly submitted to
Congress as the CRA requires. These claims have had limited success. See CAREYET AL., supra note 334,
at 18-20. A claim against a successful CRA resolution would be even more tenuous.
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Moreover, if the Trump Administration merely rescinded the rule, a future
Democratic administration could re-promulgate it. A successful CRA resolution
precludes the promulgating agency from ever again issuing a rule "in
substantially the same form" unless Congress affirmatively authorizes the
rulemaking. 34 5 The agency suffers a loss of regulatory power that a future
President, acting through the relevant agency, cannot reverse. 34 6
President Trump's early presidency has also been notable for how he has
used (and avoided) the appointments power to further his agenda. The basic story
is his strong and successful focus on appointing executive officers who are
fiercely loyal to his domestic deregulatory policies, perhaps best exemplified by
his nomination of Scott Pruitt to head the EPA.347 That aspect of Trump's
presidency is similar to how Kagan describes Reagan's appointments. 3 4 8
However, there is greater nuance to Trump's appointments practice-
particularly (i) his (now seemingly failed) attempt to install a sort-of shadow
cabinet to monitor the loyalty and progress of his various appointees and (ii) the
notably slow pace of his appointments to sub-cabinet secretary positions. 34 9
To start with the headline, Trump's deregulatory push has, thus far, been
successful in part because his appointed cabinet secretaries, or at least the ones
who have survived, are so loyal to the cause. 350 Indeed, in his picks, Trump has
put a particular emphasis on not just ideological but personal loyalty, appointing
people-like Attorney General Jeff Sessions, HUD Secretary Ben Carson, and
Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin-who showed him the strongest political
loyalty during his presidential campaign. With some exceptions, like Energy
Secretary Rick Perry, 351 criticism of Trump during the campaign has generally
been grounds for rejection or dismissal of appointees and their staff.3 52 With this
blend of personal and ideological loyalty, the legal question of presidential
345. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
346. There is, however, dispute about the scope ofthis restriction, as well as how courts
would review agency compliance.
347. See supra Section IV.B.2.
348. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2277.
349. This latter inaction may be the true face of Trumpian "deconstruction."
350. Donald Trump's Cabinet is Almost Complete. Here's the Latest List., N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/politics/donald-trump-administration.html
[http://perma.cc/3CEU-J7WH].
351. Adam Howard, Rick Peny: Trump's Candidacy a 'Cancer on Conservatism,' MSNBC
(July 23,2015,8:12 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/rick-perry-trumps-candidacy-cancer-conservatism
[http://perma.cc/B2ZN-BKFF] ("Former Texas Gov. Rick Perry called Donald Trump's politics 'toxic'
and his 2016 candidacy a 'cancer' on conservatism . . . .").
352. See Lisa Rein, Slow Pace ofTrump Nominations Leaves Cabinet Agencies 'Stuck'
in Staffing Limbo, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.comn/politics/slow-pace-of-
trump-nominations-leaves-cabinet-agencies-stuck-in-staffing-limbo/2017/04/25/al50aba-252c- 1 le7-
b503-9d6l6bd5a305_story.html [http://perma.cc/ 8FAW-S6NZ] (discussing rejection of Elliott Abrams
as Deputy Secretary of State based on his Trump criticism); Maggie Haberman & Yamiche Alcindor, A
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directive authority is often beside the point, since the directive authority is valid
as a political and social matter.
However, that does not mean there is an absolute unity between the
President and his appointees. Early on, a key point of tension was Trump's
installation of administration loyalists at various agencies to monitor political
appointees' compliance with administration priorities, what Politico called his
"shadow Cabinet."3 53 These "shadow" advisors-who are not subject to Senate
confirmation, and are allegedly selected more for political allegiance than policy
expertise-were installed at each agency but report directly to senior White
House policy advisors in the EOP. As one source put it, the White House
"want[s] to keep kind of a West Wing-infused attachment to the agencies . . . .
The effort is to demonstrate that all points lead back to" the EOP.354 Politically-
driven White House liaisons at agencies are not new (witness Obama's
aggressive use of policy czars), but the high-level access of these Trump liaisons,
both within the EOP and the agencies in which they are installed, is novel.355
Given the seeming loyalty of Trump's appointed agency heads, this shadow
Cabinet may seem superfluous. But the Trump EOP seemed to believe that,
because Trump "does not have long-standing relationships" with many of his top
appointees, monitoring was necessary.356 Also, as a senior Trump official put it,
"[a] lot of these [Cabinet heads] have come from roles where they're the
executive . .. But when you become head of an agency, you're no longer your
own person." 357 But presidential control of administration is not so
straightforward, even with ideologically aligned and personally loyal appointees.
Scott Pruitt was allegedly so frustrated with his White House liaison that Pruitt
banished him from many meetings. 358 Pentagon leadership derisively referred to
their liaison as "the commissar." 35 9
Under pressure from appointees, the Trump EOP seemingly relented on its
shadow cabinet. It began "dismantling" the network of liaisons, after "tensions
... escalated for weeks." 360 Apparently, "many" of the liaisons "had expected to
be central players at their agencies for the long haul," 36 1 but appointees managed
353. Josh Dawsey & Nancy Cook, Trump Assembles a Shadow Cabinet, POLITICO (Jan.
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to convince the EOP to end the program. One imagines that this concession to
appointees had more to do with the pride and self-worth of agency heads than
their legal understandings of their administrative authority vis-a-vis the
President. For all the constitutional and administrative theory that is trained on
presidential administration, these relationships are still socially textured. Agency
heads may heed the President's directives, but as a matter of professional self-
esteem, appointees do not want to be subject, day-to-day, to overbearing
minders.
Trump's appointed administrators also seemed frustrated at the notably
slow pace of Trump's appointments to sub-cabinet positions that require Senate
confirmation.362 The Administration explained the high number of vacancies in
appointed positions by saying the absence of appointees is deregulatory since it
immediately shrinks government in itself, but that seems like a tenuous
rationalization. Many aspects of Trump's deregulatory drive have been
successful, but slow staffing is not one of them. Indeed, this failure to staff
political appointments likely frustrated Trump's agenda. The civil service
personnel that end up managing these responsibilities are generally quite hostile
to Trump's agenda.36 3
3. Some Preliminary Assessments
In terms of the theories of presidential administration that frame this
Article, the developments concerning the structure of the administrative state
suggest several summary observations. First, presidential administration has
moved forcefully into areas where Kagan cautioned against executive
intervention. Second, politically unified government has clearly had an impact
in rolling back regulations that were adopted within the CRA window. And
finally, presidentialist policy durability seems to hinge crucially on the
institutionalization of presidential (or EOP) controls.
Last point first: in Kagan's descriptive explanation of presidentialism, the
rise of the OIRA process was central, both under Reagan and Clinton.364 And,
that process remained essentially the same under Obama as it was under Clinton.
362. Rein, supra note 352; Peter L. Strauss, Trump Administration Appointments, TAKE
CARE (Apr. 4, 2017), http://takecareblog.com/blog/trump-administration-appointments [http://perma.cc
/H9EM-PVBQ].
363. See Mark Landler, Some U.S. Diplomats Stage Quiet Revolt Amid Tensions with
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/us/politics/diplomats-quiet-
revolt-donald-trump-tensions.html [http://perma.cc/8YSC-2XV2]; Michael D. Shear & Eric Lichtblau, A
Sense of Dread' for Civil Servants Shaken by the Trump Transition, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/1 1/us/politics/a-sense-of-dread-for-civil-servants-shaken-by-trump-
transition.html [http://perma.cc/VK46-JXXS]; Juliet Eilperin et al., Resistance From Within: Federal
Workers Push Back Against Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/resistance-from-within-federal-workers-push-back-against-trump/2017/01/3 1/c65b1 10e-e7cb-
11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c-story.htmi [http://perma.cc/2MBZ-4Z4M]. As discussed above, certain
agencies like ICE are exceptions. See supra Section IV.A.2.
364. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2277-80, 2285-90.
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Where Obama made changes was in how various costs and benefits, like the cost
of carbon, were weighted in agency regulatory impact analyses and OIRA
review. Trump has thus far attempted to remake the OIRA process through the
2-for-I rule and the imposition of regulatory budgets. It remains to be seen how
successful these changes will be, but the "one-way ratchet" of executive control
may have moved even further in favor of executive authority.3 65 We have
suggested that these innovations are of problematic legality. But beyond those
legal issues, Trump's aggressive assertions of regulatory control could signal the
end of relatively bipartisan acceptance of the OIRA/cost-benefit process, which
remained largely unchanged in form from 1993 through 2016. Muscular
presidentialism can invite reaction rather than imitation.
Next, we have the compelling contrast of Obama's czars with Trump's
shadow cabinet. One imagines that both these tools for presidential control of the
regulatory state are normatively desirable from a presidentialist perspective.
Assuring effectiveness is the principal value in play. But both mechanisms serve
to remove Congress from high-level personnel decisions in the administrative
state. As for the shadow cabinet, it could have allowed the President to appoint
agency heads that appear more independent and palatable to Congress, but then
somewhat clandestinely tether them to day-to-day EOP supervision. The shadow
cabinet system is thus, perhaps, a way to avoid appropriative accountability for
just how much the White House manages the administrative state. At least czars
tend to be relatively public positions, if often unconfirmed. What is perhaps
concerning is that the shadow cabinet seemingly did not fail because it was
shadowy, but because it conflicted with the professional self-esteem of
appointees.
This case study also reveals both Obama and Trump moving presidential
administration into areas where Kagan was uncomfortable with overly assertive
presidential authority. Kagan expressed a hesitancy about presidentialism
seeping into prosecution (as opposed to regulatory policymaking),366 but
Obama's white-collar enforcement ramp-up and Trump's deportation guidance
move precisely in that direction. Trump's climate-science interventions at the
EPA are again the types of political interventions in government science that
Kagan warned against.36 7 And the intensity of the Trump Administration's
efforts in this regard seem exponentially more aggressive than those during the
second Bush Administration. Electoral accountability is not working to prevent
this practice, and this information control is hardly democracy reinforcing.
On separation of powers, the GOP's interbranch success with the CRA
aligns with the Levinson-Pildes thesis.368 In a unified government, the CRA has
365. SHANE, supra note 48, at 114; Reconcevert Almond et al., Regulatory Reform in
the Trump Era-The First 1000 Days, 35 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 29 (2018).
366. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2357-58.
367. Id. at 2356-57.
368. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 1.
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allowed Trump to supercharge his deregulatory efforts against late Obama
Administration regulations. The CRA makes these rescissions, immediate,
judicially unreviewable, and fairly permanent. However, perhaps other
experiences under Trump illustrate that the "separation of parties" thesis is only
a partial account, a thread in a more complex tapestry. Institutional differences
have still manifested in key areas. Congressional Republicans essentially
abandoned most of the Trump Administration's core spending priorities for a
recent budget resolution in favor of bipartisan collaboration within the
legislature. 3 69 And attempts to use the CRA against the Obama Administration's
methane rule failed.370
Lastly, the Trump experience shows how presidential administration can,
as it grows stronger, cancel itself out across administrations. Even putting aside
Trump's legally suspect regulatory process changes and failed shadow cabinet,
when one combines Trump's other deregulatory strategies-information control
and rescission of sub-regulatory guidance, the CRA, and sharply conservative
appointments-one sees that Obama's major regulatory accomplishments are,
for the most part,37 ' gutted or on the road to being gutted. It will take time to
rescind certain of his Administration's promulgated rules that are beyond the
CRA's reach. And efforts to do so may fail. But we predict that the Trump
Administration will ultimately be mostly successful in eliminating or mitigating
the effects of these rules through the exercise of administrative enforcement
discretion. The President's ability to control administration has become
sufficiently powerful that erasing a prior Administration requires little more than
determination-and perhaps a dash of ruthlessness.
Conclusion
We have offered some theoretical reflections on our case studies as we have
presented them, finding: continued bold attempts to accrete executive power
beyond Clinton-era presidentialism, an extension of what Shane observed during
the Bush II Administration; presidential administration insinuating itself more
and more into areas where Kagan cautioned against aggressive presidentialism,
such as prosecution/adjudication and government science; and the rise of
organizational techniques, such as policy czars and "shadow cabinets," to codify
369. Hulse, supra note 251.
370. See Davenport, supra note 341; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82
Fed. Reg. 27,430 (June 15, 2017), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-06-15/pdf/2017-12325.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M478-NPDM].
371. But see Tara Siegel Bernard, Obama's Fiduciary Rule, After a Delay, Will Go into
Effect, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/23/business/obamas-fiduciary-
rule-after-a-delay-will-go-into-effect.html [http://perma.cc/ M9YE-G4LP] (describing how Trump's
Department of Labor decided to allow a major Obama consumer protection rule for retirement savings to
go into effect); Strauss, supra note 129, at 15-16. However, aspects of the fiduciary rule seem destined
for elimination. See Extension of Transition Period and Delay of Applicability Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,365
(Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-08-31/pdf/2017-1.8520.pdf [http://perma.cc
/Z69G-4XN3].
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presidential control beyond episodic directive authority. Our case studies also
suggest a judicial anxiety with broadening presidential exercises of domestic
authority. But recent judicial opinions cabining aspects of that authority have
sometimes employed questionable reasoning from the perspective of standard
administrative law doctrine. This shaky foundation reveals that the capacity of
judicial review to check presidentialism is modest.
We also see a general lack of durability for presidential policy actions
across these two Administrations. Indeed, the speed with which presidential
administration in the Obama era has been undone in the early Trump
Administration has proven, in many instances, impressive. Pluralist skepticism
of presidential authority has, at least in some respects, had certain of its premises
vindicated. Indeed, certain passages from Madison's Nightmare provide
uncannily prescient descriptions. However, even as both sides of the political
spectrum claim executive overreach by the other, with minor libertarian
exception, neither side advocates or enacts a broad scaling back of executive
power. Even if recent political developments have demonstrated potentially
serious blind spots and the risks of Kagan-esque presidentialism as a framework
for American government, both liberals and conservatives have essentially
accepted it, to perhaps a greater extent than ever before.
Now, we pull back from specific policy realms to think more broadly about
the Obama and Trump experiences. We begin with the continuing normative
worth of presidentialism. This recent experience leaves us with a tempered view.
We then turn to separation-of-powers theory. While one certainly cannot
comprehend the function of American government without the "separation of
parties" perspective, we still see a real and important role for institutional
separation of powers, broadly understood to include judicial imposition of
congressional prerogatives and a healthy role for the federal bureaucracy in
shaping presidential administration.
Presidentialism as a Practice. We do not believe that presidential
administration-meaning, presidential exercises of constitutionally legitimate
executive power to shape implementation of the law-is either new or nefarious.
The Constitution, after all, charges the President with the duty to see that the
laws are faithfully executed. Moreover, the Founders made the deliberate
decision to make the executive power "unitary," in the sense that a single
executive exercises that power rather than a council, which was the widely-
criticized practice in some states.372 And the very first Congress affirmed, if
somewhat obliquely, that the President would not need senatorial advice and
consent to remove presidential appointees. 373 It was also the practice of early
congresses to delegate authority in a substantial number of instances to the
372. MASHAW, supra note 2, at 31.
373. Id. at 39.
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President himself, with the understanding that the President had the authority to
sub-delegate to other administrative officials.374
Over time, congressional enthusiasm for presidential administration has
waxed and waned, as evidenced by the ways in which Congress has structured
various agencies and departments. On the waning side, even the first Congress
was jealous of its own authority with respect to the Treasury. 375 And over time,
as governmental administrative capacities grew, Congress delegated more and
more authority directly to departments and agencies. While Congress gave
President Franklin Roosevelt much of what he wanted substantively in New Deal
legislation, many New Deal agencies were set up as multi-member, independent
commissions with limitations on the President's power of removal. This "new
and headless 'fourth branch' of government" as President Roosevelt's
Administration termed it,376 was less under presidential and more under
congressional control.
But the independent commission form proved disappointing from the
standpoint of energy and effectiveness. The outpouring of new legislation in
President Johnson's Great Society era avoided the commission form in
structuring important health and safety agencies like the EPA, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). Congress also clearly promoted
presidentialism when it created the OMB as a central administration
clearinghouse for both budget proposals and proposed legislative changes
emanating from existing agencies and departments. Just as George Washington
leveraged executive power by demanding to see and clear all correspondence of
his department heads, OMB has leveraged its budgetary control to screen
congressional testimony and, beginning with the Reagan's EO 12,291,3'7 to
review agency policy in the form of proposed major rules.
While both the Obama and Trump Administrations have been aggressive
in their use of presidential power to shape administrative policy, they have, at
least to a certain extent, acted within these American constitutional traditions.
Whether those traditions are good or bad has been (and remains) hotly contested.
Developing neutral criteria for evaluating exercises of presidential
administration is not easy. Most arguments for and against are highly influenced
by agreement or disagreement with the. substance of administration policy.
374. Id. at 292. But see David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory ofExecutive
Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 82 (2009) ("The Framers ... did not expect the President to act as a
policy maker in executing the law ... They viewed Congress as the chief policy maker and viewed the
President as the 'Chief Magistrate,' i.e., as the principal officer who must obey and properly carry out the
law.").
375. MASHAW, supra note 2, at 40-42.
376. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 29 (1937), http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001141809 [http://
perma.cc/3CAM-PZH2].
377. MASHAW, supra note 2, at 55.
378. Federal Regulation, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
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Kagan sought to evaluate presidential administration from the standpoint of both
energy and accountability. And while she gives presidential administration high
marks on both criteria, actions by Obama Administration officials and actions
taken in the early Trump Administration raise important questions about that
analysis.
Presidentialism, Energetic Administration and Democratic Accountability.
The energy point is intuitively attractive and dates back at least to Alexander
Hamilton's analysis in the Federalist Papers.3 7 9 And, the Obama years certainly
saw multiple uses of presidential executive power to set and promote
administrative agendas that were then carried forward by the agencies and
departments having the relevant statutory authorities. But formal presidential
control is not necessarily the main driver of agency initiatives. The CFPB was
arguably one of the most energetic agencies during the Obama years, but the
CFPB's statutory restrictions on the President's removal power caused its
structure at first to be ruled unconstitutional, though later upheld.380 Moreover,
there may be a sense in which a President's priorities energize particular agencies
while neglecting others whose powers atrophy. While the EPA and the Energy
Department have been extremely active with respect to environmental and
climate change policies, there is little evidence of energetic action at agencies
like OSHA or NHTSA.
Indeed, energy is a rather vague standard by which to evaluate
administration. Was President Obama's DACA and DAPA policy energetic
when it "de-energized" immigration enforcement? Are President Trump's
directives to multiple agencies to reconsider and perhaps amend or rescind
Obama-era regulations a sign of energetic government, or rather an attempt to
make government less active in regulating private activity? If energy means
simply promoting policy change, then perhaps all these initiatives are
"energetic." But that tends to call into question whether energy should be
understood as normatively attractive.
This question is particularly relevant when one also considers policy
durability, as this Article has. In that context, "energy" comes to seem like a
Sisyphean doing and undoing of the same policies-an expensive repetition that
thwarts the policy goals motivating both the enactment and rescission. As a
preliminary matter, surely we would at least want to substitute something like
"energetic in carrying out statutory responsibilities as reasonably interpreted,
respectful of constitutional liberties and limits on government power" into the
simple question of whether administration has been "energetic." That standard
puts in question the substance of presidential policy initiatives, not just whether,
379. THE FEDERALIST No.70, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed., 2000)
("Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.").
380. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 881
F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc ).
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at the President's direction, lots of presidentially inspired policies were zealously
implemented.
Accountability is equally difficult to evaluate. There are certainly strong
arguments for electoral accountability enhancement through presidential
administration. The cumbersomeness of the legislative process means that
American federal statutes tend to be relatively sticky. With some amendment,
they persist over decades, while circumstances on the ground and electoral
preferences shift more rapidly. That a President could make good on electoral
promises by influencing administrative policymaking makes presidential
elections something more than a mere beauty contest. On the other hand, voters
also vote retrospectively. And here, as Kagan notes, electoral accountability
depends significantly on the transparency of administrative actions and the
effectiveness of media coverage in informing voters about administrative policy
and the likely effects of administrative action.3 8 1
Shane surely has a point when he notes that transparency is often within the
control of the administration. But neither President Obama nor President Trump
have been bashful about appropriating policy positions that must be carried out
by agencies and departments that in fact have the statutory authority to act. To
that degree, appropriation promotes transparency. This has been true in both
administrations, even in areas of enforcement policy where presidentialism can
take much more subterranean forms. At the macro level, American voters can
hardly be confused concerning the differences in Obama Administration and
Trump Administration policies with respect to environmental, energy, and
immigration matters. That these Presidents appropriated or instigated these
policy changes or initiatives certainly enhanced media coverage and, therefore,
public understanding of what the government's policies were.
On the other hand, Shane is surely correct that administrations have
considerable flexibility concerning their transparency policies at more detailed
levels that are still of interest to voters (e.g., who really participated in decision-
making, whose interests are being served by particular policy initiatives, and
what information the administration has deemed relevant to decision-making).
Finally, it should be noted that to the degree that administration action is
motivated by political considerations emanating from the White House, there is
a necessary loss of transparency compared with agency action carried out
through normal administrative procedures. Particularly with respect to major
policy initiatives, the agency rulemaking process is radically transparent.
Rulemaking participation and records are open to all, and agencies may not
justify their policies on the basis of any considerations outside of the rulemaking
records. The enunciation of undisclosed "national security" or counter-terrorism
concerns in the "travel ban" would not for a moment sustain an agency rule to
the same effect.
381. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2336-37.
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Shane also has a point that media coverage is episodic and sometimes
misinformed. Our media landscape may now be so fractured that most citizens
receive their news from outlets that largely reinforce their preexisting
preferences or prejudices. On the other hand, widespread criticism of President
Obama's use of administrative authority, in domains where legislation premised
on similar or identical policies had failed, tended to weaken support for both his
immigration and clean power policies. And the consistent drumbeat of negative
coverage of the early Trump Administration is taking its toll, at least for now, on
that Administration's popularity and perceptions of its competence. Moreover, it
is far from obvious that the media would be less factional, or anti-factual, in a
pluralist system as opposed to a presidentialist one. Further, presidentialism
makes media-based accountability relatively easier.
There is, however, a somewhat different and perhaps deeper problem with
the idea that presidential administration promotes democratic accountability.
Presidential administration tends by its very nature to limit the actors who are
engaged in policy discussions and conceal the real motivations and
considerations behind the administrative policies. White House czars and OMB
oversight operate outside of the procedural requirements of the APA and other
statutes imposing participatory and transparency demands on agency processes.
Agencies must give reasons for their policies adopted by rule or through
adjudicatory processes. Those reasons must be related closely to the record
formed in their proceedings, and salient submissions by those who object must
be countered by cogent arguments-or at least arguments acceptable to
reviewing courts. Agency rulemaking processes are arguably the most open and
deliberative of any processes in American federal governance. And to that
degree, presidential administration is antithetical to the democratic
accountability that deliberative democrats view as a necessary justification for
the exercise of governmental power. Indeed, if we believe that electoral
accountability is necessarily weak at the micro level of policy detail,
presidentialism tends to short-circuit or undercut the deliberative processes that
make agency decision-making democratically accountable.
These considerations suggest that evaluating presidential administration
normatively is a subtle business. Presidentialism that takes account of process
and participatory values; is transparent and robust concerning sources, science,
and data consulted. or relied upon; that provides justificatory reasoning that
connects policies to statutory missions and criteria; and that respects legislative
prerogatives and the embedded information advantages of line agencies, is, from
our perspective, good government.3 82 Failure to abide by these conventions,
while sometimes justified, is generally problematic and anti-democratic. Indeed,
in light of recent experience, unitarian theory that bristles at these constraints and
pushes beyond presidentialism seems both dangerous and excessive. On these
382. For a recent, illuminating discussion on the important of such "procedural
legitimacy," see Chen, supra note 188, at 358.
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criteria, both the Obama and early Trump administrations are open to justifiable
complaint. However, the Obama Administration's approach was far more like
government as usual, in these normatively desirable respects.
Separated Powers or Separated Parties? In our view, Professor Cane's
rather modest claim that overall regime structure influences the control of
administrative power is more justified than the Levinson-Pildes argument that
separation of powers without separation of parties is virtually meaningless. We
should note, however, that we view both the separation of powers and the
separation of parties as having a double effect on presidential administration-
both motivating and checking presidentialism. Even absent divided government,
American presidents are motivated to engage in presidential administration by
the simple difficulty of the legislative process in Congress. Presidents who find
themselves faced with hostile majorities in either or both Houses of Congress
have that motivation enhanced. President Obama set up policies czars in the
White House and revised OMB's approach to regulatory review well before he
was faced with an intransigent Republican House of Representatives. When the
GOP took the House, of course, President Obama abandoned his position that
legislation was needed both to implement his immigration policies and to
reorient environmental policy related to climate change. Levinson and Pildes are
surely correct that separation of parties is a strong enhancement for Presidents to
act on their presidentialist tendencies.
We believe the same is true with respect to the checking function of both
separation of powers and separation of parties. When the unified government in
President Obama's first two years managed to enact health insurance reform, the
Affordable Care Act was, nevertheless, structured in a compromised form. The
ACA depended for its success on subsequent willingness to appropriate subsidy
funds and omitted the so-called "public option" that would have given the central
government much more control over costs. And the individual mandate was
backed by penalties that many observers believed inadequate to motivate
compliance. Government was unified, but the president had to accept a less than
optimal legislative design to see his signature domestic policy initiative enacted
into law. The checking function on President Obama's policies escalated
dramatically thereafter, which both prompted his independent presidential
actions and stymied his legislative agenda.38 3
President Trump has found unified government particularly attractive in
rolling back certain rules adopted late in the Obama Administration. And, of
course, the checks related to the CRA run in both directions. Republican
congresses under Obama passed five joint resolutions using the CRA, only to
have them vetoed.384 President Trump, even with unified government, has not
383. This has not always been the case. In a number of eras of divided government
presidents and congresses have cooperated to produce significant legislation. See BYRON E. SHAFER, THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL PATTERN: STABILITY AND CHANGE, 1932-2016 (2016).
384. CAREY ET AL., supra note 334, at 5.
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attempted to push through major regulatory reform legislation in Congress, but
has instead given marching orders to departmental and agency appointees. And,
Congress' initial foray into budgeting during the Trump Administration failed to
give the President funding for his much-vaunted wall.
Nor did Congress lay waste to the Environmental Protection Agency by
enacting the Trump Administration's requested major funding cut.385 Moreover,
whatever emerges from Congress and is signed by President Trump (if anything)
is unlikely to reflect presidential rather than congressional preferences, where
the two conflict. Indeed, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act seems far more a function of
congressional (rather than presidential) policymaking. As Professor Cane noted,
even in unified government American Presidents do not have the legislative
muscle of the British Prime Minister with a parliamentary majority. 38 6
Checks, Balances, and the Role of the Judiciary. As mentioned earlier, the
standard approach to judicial review of agency rulemaking reinforces
congressional power, albeit the power of the enacting Congress, not necessarily
the contemporaneous one. Courts have recently, to some degree, reinforced
presidentialism through the rejection of double for-cause removal 387 and for-
cause removal for the single-headed CFPB.38 8 But both with respect to DAPA
and Trump's travel ban, the courts have shown themselves skeptical of
aggressive presidentialism. The Texas v. United States Court not only
recharacterized the DHS guideline on enforcement policy as a rule, but also
opined that as a rule it would be substantively invalid.389 The Hawaii v. Trump
and Washington v. Trump Courts acted, in innovative fashion, to remind the new
President that his Executive Orders are cabined by constitutional restraints. 39 0
Here again, overall regime structure-the existence of an independent
judiciary-placed significant limits on presidential administration whether
exercised through departmental guidance or by independent executive action.
We do not here take a position on whether these particular judicial rulings
are appropriate responses to muscular presidentialism. We do believe, however,
that recent experience has shown that Professor Kagan's call for more limited
judicial review of agency action where policies have active presidential support
is a bad idea.391 Presidentialism needs reasonable constraint to avoid excessive,
unchecked executive action, given the one-way ratchet of power that recent
experience seems to illustrate. The virtual unreviewability of executive
enforcement and implementation discretion where that discretion is exercised to
385. Hulse, supra note 251.
386. CANE, supra note 71, at 107.
387. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
388. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), vacated and remanded, 881
F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
389. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171-76 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
390. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017); Hawai'i v. Trump,
241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017).
391. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2372-83.
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withhold action is already a powerful limitation on the judiciary's checking
functions. Moreover, Kagan's approach to judicial review exalts a one-time
electoral majority (perhaps only in the Electoral College) as the sole touchstone
of democratic legitimacy over the pluralist and deliberative processes of standard
administrative action. And it would limit judicial review as a counterweight to
presidentialism in the sense previously discussed-that is, as a re-enforcer of the
supremacy of statutes and hence of the checking power of Congress.
The Role of Embedded Bureaucracy. Although it goes well beyond the
scope of this Article, we should not leave this discussion without at least
mentioning the potential role of career bureaucrats in checking or enhancing
presidential administration. What we are calling "the embedded bureaucracy" is
not formally a part of America's separation of powers constitutional structure.
But, in some sense, the Roosevelt Administration's complaint about the
"headless 'fourth branch"' applies to executive departments and agencies, not
just to independent commissions. We mentioned earlier the different experiences
of the Obama and Trump Administrations in getting cooperation with their
enforcement policies from an immigration bureaucracy that is enforcement-
oriented. Professional role matters. Government officials do not tend to join
agencies with missions contrary to their own policy preferences or independent
professional norms. Biological scientists at the Fish and Wildlife Service did not
join that government agency because they think protecting wildlife is
unimportant. Moreover, they have professional and scientific commitments to
their discipline.
To the extent that a presidential administration attempts to promote policies
that run counter to these agency mission and staff professional norm
commitments, career bureaucrats are likely to be unenthusiastic, if not
resistant.392 And anticipation of that lack of enthusiasm or resistance to some
degree motivates presidential initiatives designed to take control of the
bureaucracy, whether it be policy czars in the Obama White House or White-
House-connected minders like those used unsuccessfully in the early Trump
Administration. There is, perhaps, an important separation-of-powers role for
this embedded bureaucracy to play-as a means to enforce congressional
priorities (albeit those of past Congresses) through bureaucratic restraint on
presidential administration. For this reason, we would question those recent
judicial opinions that have invalidated bureaucratic structures that insulate
administrators from at-will removal. These structures seem like valuable
techniques for Congress to check presidential administration in its various forms.
But an analysis of the relationship between presidents and inherited
bureaucracies and administrative structures is a topic for another day. 39 3
392. See Landler, supra note 363; Shear & Lichtblau, supra note 363; Eilperin et al.,
supra note 363; Clement, supra note 329.
393. We also leave for another day a discussion of federalism's checking power. Cases
like Texas v. United States and Massachusetts v. EPA highlight state uses of judicial review to thwart
presidential direction of administration, but states and localities have significant enforcement roles under
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numerous federal programs (and their own independent policy authority in domains also subject to federal
legislative and administrative action). As these words are written, California, itself the world's eighth-
largest economy, seems headed toward decarbonization, and sanctuary cities are throwing some sand in
the gears of ICE deportation efforts.
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